Travis Bowen v. The Utah State Bar : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Travis Bowen v. The Utah State Bar : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Billy L. Walker; Senior Counsel; Counsel for Appellee.
Gregory G. Skordas; Rebecca C. Hyde; Skordas, Caston & Hyde; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Bowen v. Utah State Bar, No. 20060950 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6889
Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Travis Bowen, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
The Utah State Bar, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Case No. 20060950-SC 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Rebecca C. Hyde 
Skordas, Caston & Hyde 
341 South Main Street, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
Billy L. Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 0 8 2007 
Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Travis Bowen, 
Petitioner, 
V . j 
The Utah State Bar, 
Respondent. 
I BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Case No. 20060950-SC 
Gregory G. Skordas Billy L. Walker 
Rebecca C. Hyde Senior Counsel 
Skordas, Caston & Hyde Office of Professional Conduct 
341 South Main Street, Suite 303 Utah State Bar 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 645 South 200 East 
Counsel for Appellant Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case 2 
Course of Proceedings 2 
Disposition at Trial Court or Agency 3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. Through This Court's Rulemaking Process, the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee's Powers to Impose Discipline Were Expanded to Include Public 
Reprimands as a Means of Preserving Court and OPC Resources; the 
Relief Mr. Bowen Requests Would Undermine This Procedural Structure, 
Create Substantial Work, and Deprive the District Court and the OPC of 
the Benefits Promoted By the Rule Changes 7 
II. Bowen's Petition Should Be Denied Because He Received Discipline 
•Consistent With the Procedures Provided By This Court in the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability, Including a Screening Panel Hearing 
and an Exceptions Hearing, and Thereby Exhausted His Remedies 11 
III. There Is No Evidence That Bias Was a Factor In Bowen's Case Before 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee 13 
IV. Even If Bowen Can now Establish Facts Which Might Raise a Potential 
Conflict of an Ethics and Discipline Committee Member, By Any Standard, 
Bowen Failed to Exercise Due Diligence and Did Not Assert His Claim of 
Bias Within a Reasonable Time 14 
V. The Relief Bowen Requests Is Not Provided for By the RLDD, and He 
Has Already Made Public the Reprimand Imposed By the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee 17 
VI. The OPC Had a Duty to Disseminate the Disciplinary Results in Bowen's 
Case and Did So Consistent With Its Usual Practices and Procedures 18 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM 
Rule 14-510, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
Travis Bowen v. Utah State Bar, Affidavit of Diane Akiyama, Supreme Court No. 
20060950, November 7, 2006 
In re Bowen, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of 
Discipline: Public Reprimand,, Case No[s]. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-0448, 
March 1,2006 
In re Bowen, Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand, Case No[s]. 05-0391, 05-
0433, 05-0628, 05-0448, June 30, 2006 
Bowen v. Utah State Ban Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order, 
Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, July 25, 2006 
Bowen v. Utah State Ban Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Third Judicial District 
Court, Case No. 060912210, August 4, 2006 
Bowen v. Utah State Bar, Docket, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 
060912210 
Bowen v. Utah State Bar, Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, August 
4, 2006 
Bowen v. Utah State Bar Memorandum Decision and Order, Third Judicial 
District Court, Case No. 060912210, October 17, 2006 
Bowen v. Utah State Bar, Petitioner's Notice of Withdrawal, Third Judicial District 
Court, Case No. 060912210, October 13, 2006 
Petition to Amend the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, In re Utah State 
Bar, Feb. 25, 2002 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997) 1,7-8 
In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 2001) 8 
In re Harding, 2004 UT 100, 104 P.3d 1220 (Utah 2004) 10, 17 
In re Pendleton, 2000 UT 96, 16 P.3d 1230 (Utah 2000) 18 
RULES 
Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon 3(E)(1)(c) 13 
Rule 14-503(d), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 11 
Rule 14-504(b)(13), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 18 
Rule 14-510, Amendment Notes, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 8 
Rule 14-510 (b)(2), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 12 
Rule 14-510 (b)(5)(E), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 8 
Rule 14-510 (c), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 8,12 
Rule 14-511(a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 17 
Rule 14-517(a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 9,15 
Rule 14-518, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 17 
Rule 14-519, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 17 
Rule 14-522, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 17 
Rule 14-523, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 17 
Summary, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 7-8 
Scope, Rules of Professional Conduct 14 
Rule 14-603(e), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9 
STATUTES 
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 15 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 16 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15 
Rule65A(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 18 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-7-1(1)(a) 14 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should the Utah Supreme Court deviate from the appellate 
procedure of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") in cases 
involving the sanction of public reprimand issued by its Ethics and Discipline 
Committee? 
2. Assuming the Utah Supreme Court does deviate from the appellate 
procedure of the RLDD, should attorneys in cases before the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee be required to exercise reasonable diligence to timely raise 
claims of error such as a claim of bias? 
3. When there is no evidence that an Ethics and Discipline Committee 
member has knowledge of a potential conflict, should bias be implied? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
For all the above issues, this is a case of first impression with respect to 
the standard of review for attorney discipline sanctions of public reprimands (or 
admonitions) imposed by the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline 
Committee. Pursuant to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the 
standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in attorney 
discipline actions before the state district courts is a correctness standard and 
the Utah Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the 
appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 
P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Rule 14-510, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. The rule is set 
forth verbatim in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is a petition for review of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee's imposition of a public reprimand against Travis Bowen for 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Course of Proceedings: In January 2006, Bowen appeared for hearings 
before a Screening Panel of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline 
Committee. After the hearings, the Screening Panel made findings and 
conclusions concerning Bowen's professional misconduct and recommended 
that he receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand. Bowen filed an 
exception to the Screening Panel's recommendation of discipline, which was 
heard by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee in June 2006. The 
Chair denied Bowen's exception, adopted the Screening Panel's 
recommendation of discipline, and issued the order of public reprimand against 
Bowen. Bowen filed a Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order in the 
District Court in July 2006, followed by a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The 
District Court dismissed Bowen's petition and denied the request for a 
preliminary injunction. Bowen filed a Petition with this Court on October 20, 
2006. The OPC responded with a memorandum in opposition. On November 
29, 2006, the Court ordered the parties to brief their respective positions. 
Disposition at Trial Court or Agency: Bowen received a public 
reprimand from the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In January 2006, Bowen appeared for hearings before a Screening Panel 
of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee. The hearings 
involved several informal complaints against Bowen alleging professional 
misconduct. See Affidavit of Diane Akiyama ("Akiyama Affidavit"), a copy of 
which is provided in the Addendum, U 4.1 Bowen was represented by counsel at 
the Screening Panel hearings. See Akiyama Affidavit, 1J 5. 
The Screening Panel that heard the Bowen matters had four members, 
including Christine Greenwood, a member of the law firm Magleby & Greenwood. 
See Akiyama Affidavit, <|J 7. At the beginning of the Screening Panel hearings on 
the Bowen matters, Greenwood identified herself and the firm to which she 
belongs. See Akiyama Affidavit, U 8. Neither Bowen nor his counsel objected to 
Greenwood sitting as a member of the Screening Panel. See Akiyama Affidavit, 
H9-
1
 Akiyama's affidavit was originally attached to the OPC's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Petition for Review of Bar Disciplinary Proceedings. 
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After the hearings, the Screening Panel made findings and conclusions 
concerning Bowen's professional misconduct. See In re Bowen, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand, 
March 1, 2006, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum. Based upon these 
findings and conclusions, the Screening Panel recommended that Mr. Bowen 
receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand. See id. 
Pursuant to Rule 14-510 of the RLDD, Bowen filed an exception to the 
Screening Panel's recommendation of discipline. See In re Bowen, Ruling on 
Exception to Recommendation for Public Reprimand, OPC No. 05-0391, 05-
0433, 05-0628, 05-0448, June 30, 2006.2 
The Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee heard Bowen's 
exceptions on June 16, 2006. See id. at 2; 5. Neither Bowen nor his counsel 
raised any issue concerning Greenwood's participation as a Screening Panel 
member. See Akiyama Affidavit, Tf 15. The Chair denied Bowen's exceptions, 
adopted the Screening Panel's recommendation of discipline, and issued the 
order of public reprimand against Bowen. See In re Bowen, Order of Discipline: 
Public Reprimand, Case No[s]. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-0448, June 30, 
2
 Although these proceedings may not be confidential within the meaning of Rule 
14-515, RLDD, a copy of this document has not been attached but will be 
provided if the Court requests it. 
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2006, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum. 
Consistent with the OPC's usual practices and procedures, the OPC 
prepared and submitted to the Utah Bar Journal a summary of discipline 
concerning Bowen's public reprimand. Akiyama Affidavit, U 15. Bowen filed a 
Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order in the District Court on July 
25, 2006. See Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order, Bowen v. 
Utah State Bar, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of 
which is provided in the Addendum. Bowen's District Court petition attached a 
copy of the Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand, as well as the Screening 
Panel's Findings and Conclusions. See id. 
On August 4, 2006, ten days after Bowen filed his Petition for Judicial 
Review of Administrative Order, he filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction See 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Bowen v. Utah State Bar, Third Judicial District 
Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum. He 
did not file a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. See Docket, Bowen v. 
Utah State Bar, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a certified 
copy of which is provided in the Addendum. Neither the Petition for Judicial 
Review of Administrative Order, nor the Motion for Preliminary Injunction or the 
memorandum filed in support thereof, raised any issue concerning the propriety 
of Greenwood participating in the Screening Panel hearing. See Memorandum 
in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Third Judicial District 
Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum. 
The OPC responded with a Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, each of which ultimately was 
successful. See Memorandum Decision and Order, Bowen v. Utah State Bar, 
Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in 
the Addendum. 
A few days before the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order, Bowen submitted a document captioned "Petitioner's Notice of 
Withdrawal." See Petitioner's Notice of Withdrawal, Bowen v. Utah State Bar, 
Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in 
the Addendum. In the Notice of Withdrawal, dated October 13, 2006, Bowen 
raised for the first time questions concerning Greenwood's participation on the 
Screening Panel, which he erroneously identified as having three members. See 
id. at 1-2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Travis Bowen was disciplined consistent with the procedures set forth in 
the RLDD, including the appeal provided under that body of rules. Bowen 
nevertheless asks the Court to review an Order of Discipline issued by the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, and requests that the 
recommendation and order be vacated and a trial de novo held in District Court, 
with a retraction of the discipline published in the Utah Bar Journal. The Court 
should deny Bowen's request, for he has had all of the due process provided 
under the RLDD, and the public reprimand entered against him should stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Through This Court's Rulemaking Process, the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee's Powers to Impose Discipline Were Expanded to Include 
Public Reprimands as a Means of Preserving Court and OPC 
Resources; the Relief Mr. Bowen Requests Would Undermine This 
Procedural Structure, Create Substantial Work, and Deprive the 
District Court and the OPC of the Benefits Promoted By the Rule 
Changes 
The RLDD were adopted in 1993, significantly changing the existing 
system of discipline to employ the District Court as the fact finder for formal 
complaints. See Summary, RLDD. The Advisory Committee on the Rules of 
Professional Conduct concluded that this model was preferable "in terms of 
economy, efficiency, public access, fairness and familiarity. Discipline ordered 
by a district court would be appealable to the Supreme Court without prior review 
by the Bar Commission." See id. 
The new rules maintained the use of the Ethics and Discipline Committee 
for imposing private discipline, but provided for review of private discipline by the 
Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, rather than the Board of Bar 
7 
Commissioners. See Summary, RLDD; see also In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 211 
(Utah 1997).3 
In 2003, the Court expanded the powers of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee to permit Screening Panels to recommend imposing public 
reprimands, which in turn are entered by the Committee's Chair. See Rule 14-
510(b)(5)(E), RLDD; see also Amendment Notes, Rule 14-510, RLDD. The rule 
permitting a respondent to submit an exception to the Screening Panel's 
recommendation of private admonition, and to have a hearing if requested, was 
amended to include public reprimands. See Rule 14-510(c), RLDD. 
It should be noted that this Court seems to have the view that a closer 
level of scrutiny by the Court is warranted in cases where an attorney's license 
might be subject to restrictive discipline such as a suspension or disbarment. 
See In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 886-887 (Utah 2001), where the Court states: 
"Because the private practice of law cannot easily be stopped and started again, 
unless there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public, a disbarred 
lawyer should be entitled to a stay of judgment pending appeal to this court 
where the final authority for discipline rests." The OPC submits that because 
3
 Bowen erroneously states that the Babilis case "concerned the rights of parties 
to appeal the recommendation of 'the Board,' which performed essentially the 
same function the screening panel now performs." Appellant Brief at 2. Instead, 
one of the issues decided by the Babilis decision was the right of the OPC to 
appeal a District Court decision. See Babilis, 951 P.2d at 213-214. 
8 
neither admonitions nor public reprimands restrict an attorney's license to 
practice, the Court by its rule change acknowledged that the due process 
provided by Rule 14-510 of the RLDD was sufficient for the imposition of the 
lesser non-restrictive sanctions without the need for further scrutiny of the Court.4 
This view is further supported by Rule 14-517(a) of the RLDD which provides: 
(a) Governing rules. Except as otherwise provided in this article, the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure governing civil appeals, and the Utah Rules of Evidence 
apply in formal discipline actions and disability actions. 
In this respect, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to formal discipline 
actions and disability actions, not the disciplinary sanctions of admonition and 
public reprimand issued by this Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee pursuant 
to Rule 14-510(b) of the RLDD, since Rule 14-510(c) of the RLDD specifically 
outlines the appellate procedure for the issuance of admonitions and public 
reprimands by this Committee. 
Additionally, this expansion of the Screening Panel's authority 
acknowledged the fact that "[u]nder the current sanctions standards the factual 
basis for a private admonition and a public reprimand is essentially the same with 
4
 Bowen asserts that a public reprimand is a "loss of liberty." Appellant Brief at 7. 
This implies that a public reprimand is similar to a suspension or disbarment with 
respect to procedural safeguards. This assertion is without support under the 
Utah Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. "Reprimand is public discipline 
which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's 
right to practice." Rule 14-603(e), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
the difference being the level of harm to the client, the legal profession, or the 
administration of justice." Petition to Amend the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability, In re Utah State Bar, Feb. 25, 2002, at 19, a copy of which is provided 
in the Addendum. As outlined further by that Petition: 
The change will allow the expedited resolution of similar cases 
because it will eliminate the need to file formal complaints in the 
district court on those cases that are only slightly above the 
standards for an admonition. . . . As a practical matter, screening 
panels rarely, if at all, vote a matter "formal" (i.e., find probable 
cause to send a case to the district court) unless they believe the 
violation warrants suspension or disbarment. This is because the 
time and expense required at the district court level is considerable, 
and it is often difficult to justify the imposition of a "mere" public 
reprimand. 
Id. 
This Court unquestionably has the ability and authority to act in matters of 
lawyer discipline at any time, and extraordinary situations might occasionally 
arise that warrant the Court ordering a departure from the rules it promulgated for 
conducting attorney discipline cases.5 Such a departure is not warranted, 
however, where the matter has proceeded through the channels already 
provided by the Court, even assuming for the sake of argument, that an error 
was committed. If that were the case, the Court may as well adopt a rule 
providing for its review of any case resulting in discipline to which the respondent 
5
 See In re Harding, 2004 UT 100 (involving the attorney discipline of a former 
judge). 
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objects, even if the respondent has already exhausted the review provided for by 
the RLDD, with the possibility of remand for a trial de novo in the District Court. 
The OPC does not think the Court wants to be in that position, and indeed, doing 
as Bowen asks would be a return to the procedures provided before the 2003 
amendments, albeit with an additional layer of review afforded through the 
exceptions process.6 
II. Bowen's Petition Should Be Denied Because He Received Discipline 
Consistent With the Procedures Provided By This Court in the Rules 
of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, Including a Screening Panel 
Hearing and an Exceptions Hearing, and Thereby Exhausted His 
Remedies 
Bowen claims he was denied due process because Greenwood was one 
of four members of the Screening Panel that heard his case. This claim is 
without merit. 
The RLDD are designed to promote "the just and speedy resolution of 
every complaint." The procedures provide for a Screening Panel hearing 
conducted by at least two members of the Bar plus one public member, and 
u[t]he concurrence of a majority of those members present and voting at any 
proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination." Rule 14-
503(d), RLDD. The respondent has the opportunity to appear and testify, along 
6
 In the OPC's view, this consideration is paramount, and so compelling that the 
Court need not even consider Mr. Bowen's underlying substantive complaints. 
Nevertheless, these are addressed below. 
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with witnesses, and to present oral argument; a written brief may also be 
submitted for consideration. See Rule 14-510(b)(2), RLDD. After reviewing the 
facts, the Screening Panel acting in behalf of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee makes a determination from among those identified in Rule 14-510. 
If the Screening Panel recommends an admonition or a public reprimand, the 
respondent has the option of submitting an exception, in which case, the Chair 
makes a determination. See Rule 14-510(c), RLDD. A hearing is provided if the 
respondent requests one. See id. 
These procedures were followed in Bowen's cases. Bowen participated at 
the Screening Panel hearings: he testified, he presented evidence, and his 
counsel presented argument. What he did not do, is raise any objection to 
Greenwood's participation as one of four Screening Panel members, despite his 
certain knowledge that the law firm Magleby & Greenwood, and specifically Mr. 
Magleby, represents the plaintiff in a civil action against him. Moreover, Bowen 
filed an exception, requested a hearing, and was afforded such a hearing before 
the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. During the exception hearing, 
Bowen and his counsel presented argument, but failed to meet the burden of 
proof by showing that the Screening Panel's recommendation was 
"unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or 
otherwise clearly erroneous." Rule 14-510(c), RLDD. They never raised any 
issue as to Greenwood. 
12 
III. There Is No Evidence That Bias Was a Factor In Bowen's Case 
Before the Ethics and Discipline Committee 
As previously mentioned, not a word was said about Greenwood's 
participation, and more importantly there is no evidence that Greenwood was 
even aware of her firm's involvement in the lawsuit against Bowen, let alone its 
particulars; or was in fact biased against him. This lack of knowledge of 
Greenwood of any possible conflict certainly counters Bowen's assertion that 
Greenwood would have had the burden or affirmative duty to recuse herself in 
his case. Appellant's Brief at 11-15. See also Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon 
3(E), and specifically 3(E)(1)(c) which requires knowledge when disqualification 
is based on financial interest. 
Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that bias may have 
flavored Greenwood's judgment in this case, there still is no evidence that her 
voice, which was merely one of four, determined the Screening Panel's decision 
to recommend a public reprimand—a recommendation independently sustained 
by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee after a hearing. The one 
person in the room during each hearing who was certainly aware that the law firm 
Magleby & Greenwood was involved in an action against Travis Bowen was 
Bowen, and he remained silent—a sign of tacit consent. 
Although the RLDD have no provision requiring recusal of Screening 
Panel members, as a matter of practice, the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee has counseled Committee members who comprise the Screening 
Panels to recuse themselves from hearing a particular case if, upon reflection, 
they believe that they cannot make an unbiased recommendation concerning the 
respondent. Any Screening Panel member proceeding with a case should be 
presumed unbiased, and Greenwood should have the benefit of that 
presumption. 
Bowen argues that the statute requiring judges to disqualify themselves in 
certain situations should apply here, but this argument is misplaced for several 
reasons. Among other things, the statute provides that a judge may not sit in any 
action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is interested. See Utah 
Code § 78-7-1 (1)(a). Aside from the fact that Greenwood was not a "judge" 
within the meaning of the statue, there is no evidence she was interested in this 
proceeding, nor is there any evidence that Magleby's use of the Utah Bar Journal 
summary of Bowen's public reprimand was the cause of any ruling or decision 
adverse to Bowen.7 
IV. Even If Bowen Can now Establish Facts Which Might Raise a 
Potential Conflict of an Ethics and Discipline Committee Member, By 
Any Standard, Bowen Failed to Exercise Due Diligence and Did Not 
Assert His Claim of Bias Within a Reasonable Time 
Bowen is essentially requesting an unlimited time for appeal because of 
7
 In the OPC's view, an attorney's discipline history is directly relevant only to 
subsequent disciplinary proceedings, and not directly relevant to civil actions to 
which an attorney is a party. See e.g. Scope, R. Pro. Con. 
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his claim of a due process violation. However, even in suspension and 
disbarment cases where a direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court is set out in 
the RLDD, an appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final order pursuant to 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 14-517(a), RLDD and Rule 
4(a), URAP. Bowen had almost six months from the time of the Screening Panel 
hearing to the exception hearing to raise his objection regarding Greenwood's 
participation at the Screening Panel hearing but he failed to do so. Bowen failed 
to raise any objections to Greenwood's participation until almost ten months after 
the Screening Panel hearing. 
Other civil cases also require issues regarding the disqualification of a 
judge to be raised within a reasonable time prior to the appellate level. Rule 
63(b)(1)(B)(iii) requires that motions to disqualify a judge be filed not later than 20 
days after "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion 
is based." Rule 63, URCP. Bowen should have learned of Greenwood's 
potential conflict by the exception hearing. Greenwood identified herself and the 
firm to which she belongs, which included Magleby's name, at the Screening 
Panel hearing. Bowen was also aware of the malpractice case against him and 
the identity of Magleby as opposing counsel. As far as the OPC knows, Bowen 
made no effort to review the Screening Panel hearing record, i.e. requests for a 
copy of the Screening Panel hearing tape or other hearing records prior to the 
exception hearing. Even when Bowen finally raised his objections for the first 
time in his Notice of Withdrawal dated October 13, 2006, he raised his concerns 
more than twenty days after he claims Magleby raised the Bar Journal in his oral 
arguments in the malpractice case on September 19, 2006. See Petitioner's 
Notice of Withdrawal a copy of which is provided in the Addendum, and 
Appellant's Brief at 9. The exception process afforded Bowen more than enough 
time to make reasonably diligent efforts to learn of his objections to Greenwood's 
participation but he failed to timely raise the issue. 
Additionally, it should be noted that motions for relief from an order or 
judgment are required to be filed within a reasonable time with a three-month 
limit for mistakes, newly discovered evidence or fraud. See Rule 60(b), URCP. 
Bowen still failed to timely raise his objection under the timeframe set out under 
Rule 60(b), URCP. With due diligence, Bowen should have been able to discover 
evidence regarding his objections to Greenwood's participation within three 
months from the date of the Screening Panel hearing. Thus, Bowen has not 
demonstrated that he made any active attempt within a reasonable amount of 
Furthermore, given the fact that during the six months between the Screening 
Panel hearing (where Greenwood very clearly identified Magleby as part of her 
firm), and the exception hearing both the Screening Panel hearing and the 
malpractice case (where Magleby was opposing counsel) were ongoing issues 
for Bowen, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Bowen should have inquired 
whether both "Maglebys" were the same attorney. This is especially reasonable 
since the name "Magleby" is not a common name. 
16 
time to discover evidence that Greenwood knew of the involvement of her firm 
with his case. 
V. The Relief Bowen Requests Is Not Provided for By the RLDD, and He 
Has Already Made Public the Reprimand Imposed By the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee 
In matters that do not involve interim suspension proceedings,9 reciprocal 
discipline,10 or proceedings in which a lawyer is declared to be incompetent or 
alleged to be incapacitated,11 the RLDD limit the District Court's jurisdiction to 
disciplinary matters in which a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee "finds probable cause to believe that there are grounds for public 
discipline and that a formal complaint is merited."12 Rule 14-511(a), RLDD. The 
RLDD do not provide for the District Court to conduct de novo hearings on 
informal complaints when a Screening Panel has recommended an admonition 
or a public reprimand. Accordingly, the relief Mr. Bowen requests is outside the 
rules. 
Bowen asked the District Court for injunctive relief in the form of an order 
barring the Utah State Bar from publishing the fact that he was publicly 
reprimanded. However, Bowen did not perfect his request for injunctive relief by 
9
 See Rules 14-518 and 14-519, RLDD. 
10
 See Rule 14-522, RLDD. 
11
 See Rule 14-523, RLDD. 
12
 As the Harding decision made clear, however, the Supreme Court may direct 
the OPC to refer the matter directly to it, thereby by-passing the District Court. 
See In re Harding, 2004 UT 100, fi 19. 
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submitting an affidavit or verified complaint for a temporary restraining order 
pending adjudication of the District Court case. See Rule 65A(b), URCP. 
Furthermore, his petition in the District Court rendered moot the relief he 
requested, inasmuch as it attached the disciplinary order as "Appendix A." The 
reprimand is now a public document, available to anyone interested in the case. 
VI. The OPC Had a Duty to Disseminate the Disciplinary Results in 
Bowen's Case and Did So Consistent With Its Usual Practices and 
Procedures 
The OPC has a duty delegated to it by this Court to "disseminate public 
disciplinary results to the Bar and the public through the Utah Bar Journal . . . ." 
Rule 14-504(b)(13), RLDD; see also Pendleton v. Utah State Bar, 16 P.3d 1230, 
1232 (Utah 2000) (the OPC's official duties include publishing disciplinary 
summaries in the journal). 
Bowen received a public reprimand pursuant to the RLDD and had 
exhausted his exception remedy. The OPC was not restricted based on the 
mere request for injunctive relief and Bowen had already "published" the 
disciplinary result with the District Court. Thus, the OPC proceeded as usual with 
drafting a disciplinary summary and submitting it for publication to the Utah Bar 
Journal. Doing otherwise would have been an abrogation of its duties and a 
departure from its practice in other cases. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
In exercising its exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law, 
including matters of discipline for professional misconduct, the Utah Supreme 
Court promulgated the RLDD. These rules afford Respondents the opportunity 
to appear before a Screening Panel of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and 
Discipline Committee which has authority, among other things, to recommend 
that a Respondent receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand. If a 
Respondent wishes to seek review of such a recommendation, it is through filing 
an exception, which may be heard by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee. 
The RLDD provide no additional recourse, and although the Court could 
exercise its original jurisdiction at any point, and presumably could order the 
District Court to proceed de novo, there is no sound basis for departing from the 
established rules promulgated by this Court. Bowen was aware that Greenwood 
was a member of the law firm Magleby & Greenwood, but neither he nor his 
counsel objected to her participation in the Screening Panel hearing, and they 
raised no concerns along these lines at the exception hearing. Indeed, Bowen 
did not even mention it until withdrawing his ill-conceived District Court petition. 
19 
The public reprimand was imposed consistent with the RLDD, and the Court 
should decline Bowen's Petition. 
DATED: February ^ , 2007. 
UTAH STATE BAR 
Billy L. Walker 
Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the r day of February, 2007, I caused to be 
mailed via United States mail, first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to Gregory G. Skordas and 
Rebecca C. Hyde at the following address: SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, LLC, 
341 South Main Street, Suite 303, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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Rule 14-510. Prosecution and appeals. 
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct. 
(a)(1) Filing. A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member of 
the Bar by any person, OPC counsel or the Committee, by filing with the Bar, in writing, 
an informal complaint in ordinary, plain and concise language setting forth the acts or 
omissions claimed to constitute unprofessional conduct. Upon filing, an informal 
complaint shall be processed in accordance with this article. 
(a)(2) Form of informal complaint. The informal complaint need not be in any 
particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal writing, although a form 
may be provided by the OPC to standardize the informal complaint format. It is 
unnecessary that the informal complaint recite disciplinary rules, ethical canons or a 
prayer requesting specific disciplinary action. The informal complaint shall be signed by 
the complainant and shall set forth the complainant's address, and may list the names 
and addresses of other witnesses. The informal complaint shall be notarized and 
contain a verification attesting to the accuracy of the information contained in the 
complaint. In accordance with Rule 14-504(b), complaints filed by OPC are not required 
to contain a verification. The substance of the informal complaint shall prevail over the 
form. 
(a)(3) Initial investigation. Upon the filing of an informal complaint, OPC counsel 
shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the informal complaint is 
sufficiently clear as to its allegations. If it is not, OPC counsel shall seek additional facts 
from the complainant; additional facts shall also be submitted in writing and signed by 
the complainant. 
(a)(4) Notice of informal complaint. Upon completion of the preliminary 
investigation, OPC counsel shall determine whether the informal complaint can be 
resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and the complainant's interest. 
OPC counsel and/or the screening panel may use their efforts to resolve the informal 
complaint. If the informal complaint cannot be so resolved or if it sets forth facts which, 
by their very nature, should be brought before the screening panel, or if good cause 
otherwise exists to bring the matter before the screening panel, OPC counsel shall 
cause to be served a NOIC by regular mail upon the respondent at the address 
reflected in the records of the Bar. The NOIC shall have attached a true copy of the 
signed informal complaint against the respondent and shall identify with particularity the 
possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct raised by the informal 
complaint as preliminarily determined by OPC counsel. 
(a)(5) Answer to informal complaint. Within 20 days after service of the NOIC on 
the respondent, the respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and signed answer 
setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal complaint, 
together with all defenses and responses to the claims of possible misconduct. For 
good cause shown, OPC counsel may extend the time for the filing of an answer by the 
respondent not to exceed an additional 30 days. Upon the answer having been filed or if 
the respondent fails to respond, OPC counsel shall refer the case to a screening panel 
for investigation, consideration and determination. OPC counsel shall forward a copy of 
the answer to the complainant. 
(a)(6) Dismissal of informal complaint. An informal complaint which, upon 
consideration of all factors, is determined by OPC counsel to be frivolous, unintelligible, 
barred by the statute of limitations, more adequately addressed in another forum, 
unsupported by fact or which does not raise probable cause of any unprofessional 
conduct, or which OPC declines to prosecute may be dismissed by OPC counsel 
without hearing by a screening panel. OPC counsel shall notify the complainant of such 
dismissal stating the reasons therefor. The complainant may appeal a dismissal by OPC 
counsel to the Committee chair within 15 days after notification of the dismissal is 
mailed. Upon appeal, the Committee chair shall conduct a de novo review of the file, 
either affirm the dismissal or require OPC counsel to prepare a NOIC, and set the 
matter for hearing by a screening panel. In the event of the chair's recusal, the chair 
shall appoint the vice chair or one of the screening panel chairs to review and determine 
the appeal. 
(b) Proceedings before Committee and screening panels. 
(b)(1) Review and investigation. A screening panel shall review all informal 
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts developed by the 
informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, and the recommendations of 
OPC counsel. 
(b)(2) Respondent's appearance. Before any action is taken which may result in 
the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal complaint, the screening 
panel shall, upon at least 14 days notice, afford the respondent an opportunity to appear 
before the screening panel and testify under oath, together with any witnesses called by 
the respondent, and to present an oral argument with respect to the informal complaint. 
All testimony shall be recorded and preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and 
in any event, not less than six months following the hearing. A written brief may also be 
submitted to the screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall not exceed five 
pages in length unless permission for enlargement is extended by the chair or the 
chair's delegate for good cause shown. A copy of the brief shall be forwarded by OPC 
counsel to the complainant. 
(b)(3) Complainant's appearance. A complainant shall have the right to appear 
before the screening panel personally and testify under oath, together with any 
witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to the informal complaint or in 
opposition to the matters presented by the respondent. The complainant may be 
represented by counsel or some other representative. 
(b)(4) Right to hear evidence. The complainant and the respondent shall each 
have the right to be present during the presentation of the evidence unless excluded by 
the screening panel chair for good cause shown. 
(b)(5) Screening panel determination. Upon review of all the facts developed by 
the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the screening panel, in behalf 
of the Committee, shall make one of the following determinations: 
(b)(5)(A) that the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is 
probable cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, in which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel 
shall promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant 
and the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(B) that a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed 
by OPC counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the 
future conduct of the respondent. Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be 
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the 
dismissal. The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the caution; or 
(b)(5)(C) that a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by 
the respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be 
warranted by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct; or 
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair 
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be 
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and shall 
state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the 
basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. A copy of such screening 
panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of 
the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an 
order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days 
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair 
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent 
receive a public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in 
writing and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and 
defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public 
reprimand. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be served 
upon the respondent prior to the delivery of the recommendation to the 
Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an order publicly reprimanding 
the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days of notice of the 
recommendation being provided to the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(F) that a formal complaint be filed against the respondent. 
(b)(6) Determination of appropriate sanction. In determining an appropriate 
sanction and only after having found unethical conduct, the screening panel may 
consider any admonitions or greater discipline imposed upon the respondent within the 
five years immediately preceding the alleged offense. 
(b)(7) Continuance of disciplinary proceedings. A disciplinary proceeding may be 
held in abeyance by the Committee prior to the filing of a formal complaint when the 
allegations or the informal complaint contain matters of substantial similarity to the 
material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation in which the respondent is 
involved. 
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands. Within ten days after notice of the 
recommendation of an admonition or public reprimand to the Committee chair, the 
respondent may file with the Committee chair an exception to the recommendation and 
may also, if desired, request a hearing. If a request for a hearing is made, the 
Committee chair, or a screening panel chair designated by the Committee chair, shall 
proceed to hear the matter in an expeditious manner, with OPC counsel and the 
respondent having the opportunity to be present. The complainant's testimony may be 
read into the record. The complainant need not appear personally unless called by the 
respondent as an adverse witness for purposes of cross-examination. The respondent 
shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation is unreasonable, 
unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly 
erroneous. 
Kate A. Toomey, #6446 
Deputy Counsel 
Billy L. Walker, #3358 
Senior Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Travis Bowen, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
v. ] 
The Utah State Bar, ; 
Respondent. 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
} DIANE AKIYAMA 
I Case No. 20060950-SC 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Diane Akiyama, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. • I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify, and have 
personal knowledge of the matters stated herein. 
2. I am an attorney employed by the Utah State Bar's Office of 
Professional Conduct ("OPC"). My responsibilities include prosecuting before the 
Screening Panels of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee 
informal complaints against attorneys. 
3. I was the attorney assigned primary responsibility for the informal 
complaints against Travis Bowen that are in issue here. 
4. On January 19, 2006, Mr. Bowen appeared for hearings before a 
Screening Panel of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee 
involving four informal complaints against him alleging professional misconduct. 
5. At the Screening Panel hearings on January 19, 2006. Mr. Bowen 
was represented by counsel, Charles Gruber and Mary Ann Q. Wood. 
6. I was also present for the January 19 Screening Panel hearings 
involving Mr. Bowen. 
7. The Screening Panel that heard the Bowen matters had four 
members, including Christine Greenwood, who is a member of the law firm 
Magleby & Greenwood. 
8. At the beginning of the Screening Panel hearings on the Bowen 
matters, Ms. Greenwood identified herself and the firm to which she belongs. 
9. Neither Bowen nor his counsel objected to Ms. Greenwood sitting 
as a member of the Screening Panel. 
10. After the hearings, the Screening Panel made findings and 
conclusions concerning Bowen's professional misconduct and recommended 
that Bowen receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand. 
11. Pursuant to Rule 10 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
("RLDD"). Bowen filed an exception to the Screening Panel's recommendation of 
discipline. 
12. The Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee heard the matter 
on June 16,2006. 
13. Mr. Bowen was present for the exception hearing on June 16, as 
was his counsel, Greg Skordas. 
14. I was also present for the exception hearing on June 16, 2006. 
15. Neither Mr. Bowen nor Mr. Skordas raised any issue during the 
exception hearing concerning Greenwood's participation as a Screening Panel 
member. 
16. Consistent with the OPC's usual practices and procedures, I 
prepared and submitted to the Utah Bar Journal a summary of discipline 
concerning Mr. Bowen's public reprimand. 
.-•r-i'H DATED this T day of November, 2006. 
/7/i...-, (ib^^ Mi 
Diane Akiyama 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7 day of November, 
2006. 
My commission expires: 
_ y <'< <\ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: _ cdi ial/.i f]o. , Uicii-•a, 
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BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Travis Bowen, #00397 
Re spondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0443, 
05-0628 
The matter of the complaints by Keith Kelly, Richard Smurthwaite, Michael 
Walch, and Trevin Workman against Travis Bowen came on for hearing before 
Screening Panel UC-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme 
Court on January 19, 2006. Mr. Kelly, Mr. Smurthwaite, Mr. Walch and Mr. Workman 
appeared in person without counsel, Mr. Bowen appeared in person with Charles 
Gruber and Mary Anne Wood as counsel; and Diane Akiyama, Assistant Counsel, 
appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"). 
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr Bowen be publicly reprimanded for violating 
Rules 1 5(aJ (Fees;. 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) 7.1 (a; (Communications 
Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads), 7.5;d) (Firm 
Names and Letterhead), 8 Kb) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8 4'aj 
!/Misconduci; of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes 
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. 
Bowen should be publicly reprimanded are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Bowen's fees charged to his client in trade for office furniture was an 
excessive fee considering the time and labor and the skill required to provide the 
service. 
2. Mr. Bowen traded estate planning with a legal fee of $57,450.00 foi the 
office furniture. 
3. The fee charged by Mr. Bowen was in excess of the fees typically charged 
for similar legal services in this community. 
4. Mr. Bowen instructed his staff to increase his standard legal fee for the 
work to be performed in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. 
5. Mr. Bowen would recommend that his clients purchase certain life 
insurance products. 
6. Mr. Bowen represented clients without first disclosing to them his or his 
firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchased certain life 
insurance products. 
7. Mr Bowen's expectation of financial benefits from the commissions as a 
result of life instance products was not disclosed during client meetings. 
8. Mr Bowen's letterhead showed office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and 
Walnut Creek, California when he did not have offices in those locations. 
9. The identification of the Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm locations aie 
misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients of Mr Bowen's 
firm. 
10. Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho is misleading 
because he does not have a law office in Idaho. 
11. Mr. Bowen used an "of counsel" relationship on his letterhead with 
Jonathan Duke, when in fact, he did not have such a relationship. 
12. Mr. Duke did not grant his permission to Mr. Bowen nor to Mr. Bower,'s 
firm to indicate an "of counsel" relationship, or any other relationship, on the letterhead. 
13. Mr. Bowen knowingly failed to provide certain documents requested by 
the OPC in this disciplinary matter. 
14. Some of the specific documents that the Screening Panel ("Pane!") 
•discovered existed, but were not provided to the OPC in this disciplinary matter, are the 
Crown Counsel Agreemient, the Xelan Agreement, documents of purported agreements 
with attorneys Duke and Oshins and email from Duke, and the invoice loi furniture 
purchased by Mr Bowen's firm and paid with attorney services in part 
15 Form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations of failure to 
disclose benefits lo the firm, of thirc party ser/ices/producis (i e insurance purchased by 
clients; wouid nave been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel. Mr Bower die leave 
with the Panel a stack of records that were represented to be these disclosures, but the 
Panel could not consider the additional documents as a basis for its decision as the 
hearing had concluded and the complainants were leaving. 
16. The disciplinary process was substantially impeded as a result of the 
failure to provide documents to OPC. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)) 
1. Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) states that "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement 
for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, 
after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and 
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." This fee is in excess of the 
fee typically charged for similar legal services in this community. Further, Laura Guthrie 
testified that Mr. Bowen instructed her to increase Mr. Bowen's standard legal fees for 
the work to be perfored in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. By 
charging to his client in trade for office furniture an excessive fee, considering the time 
and labor and the skill required to provide the service, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 1.5(a) 
(Fees). 
(Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule)) 
2. Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) states that 
A lawyer snail not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person or by the lawyers own interest, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
the representation will not be adversely affected; (2) and each client consents after 
consultation. 
Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefit from the commissions as a result of sales of 
life insurance products was not disclosed during client meeting according to the testimony 
of Laura Guthrie. By representing clients, no matter the number of clients, without first 
disclosing to them Mr. Bowen's or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained by 
the firm if the clients purchased certain life insurance policies, Mr, Bowen violated Rule 
1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule). 
(Rule 7,1 (a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyers Services)) 
3. Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) states that 
"A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading." Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.1 (a) 
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) when his letterhead showed office 
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and Walnut Creek, California when he did not have 
offices in those locations. 
(Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads)) 
4. Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "A lawyer shall not 
use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.. . ." 
Mr. Bowen testified regarding some affiliations perhaps in Las Vegas, Nevada and 
Walnut Creek, California however his testimony was not clear nor specific about the 
alleged affiliations within those states. Mr. Bowen failed to produce any other evidence 
in the form of witnesses or documents to show that his use of these office locations on 
his letterhead was a proper representation of his firm's structure and services. The 
OPC met its burden to prove that the identification of Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm 
locations were misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients 
of Mr. Bowen's firm. Additionally, Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho 
is misleading because he does not have a law office in Idaho. The panel finds that 
considering the identification of the three out of state alleged law firm offices on Mr. 
Bowen's letterhead, taken as a whole, is materially misleading the public, potential 
clients and clients about the scope of services available, and the base of knowledge of 
the firm's lawyers. By listing office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada, Walnut Creek, 
California and Idaho on his letterhead when he did not have law offices in those 
locations, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads). 
(Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads)) 
5. Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "Lawyers may state 
or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the 
fact." Mr. Duke testified that he and Mr. Bowen had contemplated an "of counsel" 
relationship,, drafted a proposed agreement concerning a potential affiliation and 
discussed the matter on and off, but nothing was concluded nor finalized between 
them. Mr. Bowen did not produce any evidence to the contrary; except to state that Mr. 
Duke was "confused." The Panel finds that the OPC met its burden of proof to support 
a violation by Mr. Bowen of this rule. By the use of an "of counsel" relationship on his 
letterhead with an attorney when, in fact, he did not have such a relationship, Mr. 
Bowen violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads). 
(Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admiss ion and Disciplinary Matters)) 
6. Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) states that " . . . a 
l awye r . . . in connection with a. disciplinary matter shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond 
to a. lawful demand for information from . . . disciplinary authority, except that this Rule 
does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by PsUle 1.6." 
7. The representation made at the Screening Panel Hearing consisted 
mainly of a concern producing records in violation of Ruie 1.6, confidentiality of client 
matters and pending litigation between the Complainant and respondent. The Panel 
considered the arguments regarding Rule 1.6 and pending litigation. However, with 
respect to those records that were clearly not related to client confidentiality (Rule 1.6), 
or the pending iitigation (which the.Panel questions to be a valid excuse), Mr. Bowen 
failed to provide them to OPC when requested to do so. Some of the specific 
documents that the Panel discovered existed, but were not provided to OPC would 
nave been helpful to OPC and to the Panel if provided before the Hearing, or, for some, 
if provided at all. Additionally, form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations 
of failure to disciose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance 
purchased by clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel. 
Although Mr. Bowen did leave with the Pane! a stack of records that were represented 
to be these disclosures the Panel could not consider the additional documents as a 
basis for its decision. When the documents were provided, the hearing had concluded 
and the complainants were leaving. 
8. The Panel was concerned that documents, such as forms of client 
disclosures were not provided to OPC. The Panel felt that a strategy of "stonewalling" 
was used so not to provide requested information to the OPC in defense of the 
allegations against Mr. Bowen. However, the Panel recognized the arguments that 
appeared to have been brought in good faith by counsel for not producing some 
documents. The documents not related to client confidences should have been 
produced as requested. The Panel finds that this disciplinary process was substantially 
impeded as a result of the failure to provide documents to OPC. By failing to provide 
certain documents requested by the OPC in this disciplinary matter, Mr. Bowen violated 
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters). 
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct)) 
9. Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) states that "It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
assist or induce another to do so; or do so through the acts of another." By violating the 
aforementioned Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 8.4(a) 
(Misconduct). 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Travis Bowen 
be publicly reprimanded for violation 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General 
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names 
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct), Rules of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
It is the intent of the Panel for the four cases against the respondent to be 
consolidated into one case only. The facts and circumstances arise out of common 
and connected events with the same complainants". Therefore, the Panel intends to 
find only one instance of a violation for each rule. 
o 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this (i4-h day of Ju l^ _p 200G, I sent via 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Travis Bo wen 
c/o Gregory Skordas 
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C. 
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard Smurthwaite 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Trevin G. Workman 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Keith A Kelly 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Michael C. Walch 
Gateway Tower, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Bowen, Travis #00397 
Respondent. 
: ORDER OF DISCIPLINE; 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 
05-0448 
05-0628, 
These matters came on for hearing on January 19, 2006 before Screening Panel 
"C-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Travis Bowen be and is hereby, PUBLICLY 
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of interest: General 
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names 
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this the 3<f f i jay of PfU^^ 2006. 
Lawrence E. Sievens: Chair 
Ethics and Discipline Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the lI'4V\ day of Jmlbj 2006 I sent via United States 
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Travis Bowen 
c/o Gregory Skordas 
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C. 
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard Smurthwaite 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Trevin G. Workman 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Keith A Kelly 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Michael C. Walch 
Gateway Tower, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
2 
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
SKORDAS GASTON & HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant 
9 Exchange Place, .Suite 1 104 
Salt Laketily, UT 841 ] 1 
Tel. 801.531.7444 
Fax. 801.531.8885 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Travis Bowen, | PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
Petitioner, | REVIEW OF 
| ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 
v. | 
i Case No. O l / \ r j \'L'L\Q 
The Utah State Bar | , 
Respondent. j Judge L ^ V l t V r V l 
I 0 
Travis Bowen. by and through his attorney Gregory G. Skordas. hereby Petitions 
the Court for a Judicial Review from an Administrative Order, issued by the Utah State 
Bar. Office of Professional Conduct, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 7. 2006, Counsel for Mr. Bowen received the Final Order of the 
Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, with the recommendation that 
Mr. Bowen receive a Public Reprimand (a copy of the Order and Recommendation is 
attached hereioj. Having exhausted the appeals process of the Utah State Bar; Petitioner 
submits this Petition for Judicial Review. Petitioner Bowen seeks the intervention of the 
CoLiil to grant h trial de novo pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-4Gb-l 5. 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE 
1. Petitioner, Travis Bowen is an individual who conducts business at 175 S. 
West Temple, Suite 710, Salt Lake City, UT, 8411 ]. 
2. The Utah State Ear is an administrative agency located at 465 E. 200 S.:. 
Salt Lake City, UT, 84111. 
3. The Court has jurisdiction to review' by trial de novo all final agency 
actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-15. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. Travis Bowen is a licensed attorney in the State of Utah, who practices 
law within the State of Utah. 
5. The Utah State Bar is an administrative agency that regulates the practice 
of law in Utah and performs tasks of disciplining attorneys. 
6. An informal complaint against Mr. Bowen was filed with the Office of 
Professional Conduct ("OPC") of the Utah State Bar. 
7. The informal complaint was screened by a Screening Panel of the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee. 
:
 Peiiiionej ha: exhausted ail administrative remedies available pursuant to "Utah Code Ann vG3-46i>]4. 
anc an excepiioi. to the Commiuee Chair has been completed, satisfying Utah Code Ann §63-46b-13. 
8. The Screening Pane] of the Ethics and Discipline Committee voted to 
issue Travis Bowen a Public Reprimand aftei an informal adjudicative proceeding 
9. Counsel for Travis Bowen requested an exception to the recommendation 
and a hearing before the Committee Chair. 
1 0. The Committee Chair adopted the recommendation of the Screening Pane] 
after a hearing. 
1 ]. Petitioner contends that there was not a preponderance of the evidence to 
establish that Mr. Bowen should be publicly reprimanded. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The Petitioner respectfully requests that the Third District Court grant a trial de 
novo and issue an order vacating the issuance of a Public Reprimand. In addition, 
Petitioner requests an injunction to bar the Utah State Bar from publishing a Public 
Reprimand until Petitioner has exhausted the Court's appeal process. Petitioner further 
requests that a hearing on this matter be scheduled at the earliest possible date and that 
notice of such hearinc be sent directly to the Petitioner as well as to Petitioner's counsel. 
DATED this 20th day of Jul v. 2006. 
' (Jr^^rjf^D. Skordas 
Aitoiii^'for Petitioner 
\ 
\ 
Appendix A 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
in the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Bowen, Travis #00397 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 05-0391; 05-0433, 05-0628, 
05-0448 
These matters came on for hearing on January 19, 2006 before Screening Panel 
MC-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Pane!, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Travis Bowen be and is hereby, PUBLICLY 
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of interest: Genera! 
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications. Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names 
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this the 3 < ^ d a y o f fyu^~ ,2006. 
{/ 
Lawrence E. Stevens, Chair 
Ethics and Discipline Commits 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (J-4V\ day of •JIUIM 2006 I sent via United States 
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Travis Bowen 
c/o Gregory Skordas 
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C. 
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard Smurthwaite 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Trevin G. Workman 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Keith A Kelly 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Michael C. Walch 
Gateway Tower, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64133 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Travis Bowen, #00397 
Re sponde jnt. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case Ho. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0448, 
05-0628 
The matter of the complaints by Keith Kelly, Richard Smurthwaite. Michael 
Waich, and Trevin Workman against Travis Bowen came on for hearing before 
Screening Panel "C-T of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme 
Court on January 19, 2006. Mr. Kelly, Mr. Smurthwaite, Mr. Walch and Mr. Workman 
appeared in person without counsel, Mr. Bowen appeared in person with Charles 
Gruber and Mary Anne 'Wood as counsel; and Diane Akiyama, Assistant Counsel, 
appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"). 
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr Bowen be publicly reprimanded for violating 
Rules 1.5(a) (Fees;, 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications 
Concerning a Lawyers Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm 
Names and Letterhead). 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8 4(a) 
(Misconauci) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes 
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. 
Bowen should be publicly reprimanded are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Bowen's fees charged to his client in trade for office furniture was an 
excessive fee considering the time and labor and the skill required to provide the 
service. 
2. Mr. Bowen traded estate planning with a legal fee of $57,450.00 for the 
office furniture. 
3. The fee charged by Mr. Bowen was in excess of the fees typically charged 
for similar legal services in this community. 
4. Mr. Bowen instructed his staff to increase his standard legal fee for the 
work to be performed in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. 
5. Mr. Bowen would recommend that his clients purchase certain life 
insurance products. 
6. Mr. Bowen represented clients without first disclosing to them his or his 
firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchased certain life 
insurance products. 
7. Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefits from the commissions as a 
result of life insurance products was not disch^ri during client meetings. 
8. Mr. Bowen's letterhead showed office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and 
Walnut Creek, California when he did not have offices in those locations. 
9. The identification of the Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm locations are 
misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients of Mr. Bowen's 
firm. 
10. Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho is misleading 
because he does not have a law office in Idaho. 
11. Mr. Bowen used an "of counsel" relationship on his letterhead with 
Jonathan Duke, when in fact, he did not have such a relationship. 
12. Mr. Duke did not grant his permission to Mr. Bowen nor to Mr. Bowen's 
firm to indicate an "of counsel" relationship, or any other relationship, on the letterhead. 
13. Mr. Bowen knowingly failed to provide certain documents requested by 
the OPC in this disciplinary matter. 
14. Some of the specific documents that the Screening Panel ("Panel") 
discovered existed, but were not provided to the OPC in this disciplinary matter, are the 
Crown Counsel Agreement, the Xelan Agreement, documents of purported agreements 
with attorneys Duke and Oshins and email from Duke, and the invoice for furniture 
purchased by Mr. Bowen's firm and paid with attorney services in part. 
15. Form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations of failure to 
disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance purchased by 
clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Pane!. Mr. Bowen did leave 
with the Pane! a stack of records that were represented to be these disclosures, but the 
Panel could not consider the additional documents as a basis for its decision as the 
hearing had concluded and the complainants were leaving. 
16. The disciplinary process was substantially impeded as a result of the 
failure to provide documents to OPC. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)) 
1. Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) states that "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement 
for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, 
after a review-of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and 
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." This fee is in excess of the 
fee typically charged for similar legal services in this community. Further, Laura Guthrie 
testified that Mr, Bowen instructed her to increase Mr. Bowen's standard legal fees for 
the work to be perfored in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. By 
charging to his client in trade for office furniture an excessive fee, considering the time 
and labor and the skill required to provide the service, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 1.5(a) 
(Fees). 
(Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule)) 
2. Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) states that 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person or by the lawyers own interest unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
the representation will not be adversely affected; (2) and each client consents after 
consultation. 
Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefit from the commissions as a result of sales of 
life insurance products was not disclosed during client meeting according to the testimony 
of Laura Guthrie. By representing clients, no matter the number of clients, without first 
disclosing to them Mr. Bowen's or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained by 
the firm if the clients purchased certain life insurance policies, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 
1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule). 
(Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services)) 
3. Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) states that 
"A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading." Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.1(a) 
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) when his letterhead showed office 
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and Walnut Creek, California when he did not have 
offices in those locations. 
(Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads)) 
4. Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "A lawyer shall not 
use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.. . ." 
Mr. Bowen testified regarding some affiliations perhaps in Las Vegas, Nevada and 
Walnut Creek California however his testimony was not cleai nor specific about the 
alleged affiliations within those states Mr Bowen failed to produce any other evidence 
in the foim of witnesses 01 documents to show/ that his use of these office locations on 
his letterhead was a proper representation of his firms structure and services The 
OPC met its burden to prove that the identification of Walnut Creek and Las vegas firm 
locations weie misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients 
of Mr Bowen s firm Additionally, Mr Bowen s placement of an office location in Idaho 
is misleading because he does not have a law office in Idaho The panel finds that 
considering the identification of the three out of state alleged law firm offices on Mr 
Bowen's letterhead, taken as a whole, is materially misleading tne public, potential 
clients and clients about the scope of services available, and the base of knowledge of 
the firm's lawyers By listing office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada, Walnut Creek, 
California and Idaho on his letterhead when he did not have law offices in those 
locations, Mr Bowen violated Rule 7 5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads) 
(Rule 7 5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads)) 
5 Rule 7 5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads; states that "Lawyers may stale 
or imply tnat they practice in a partnersnip or otner organization only when that >s the 
fact' Mr Dul-e testified that ne and l/lr Bowen nad contemplated an of counsJ' 
relationship crafied a propcsed agreement concerning a potent al animation and 
d'scjcsed ihe majer on and orf DJ! notning was conduced nor finalized between 
tnen IV Er> e" sic not produce am essence ic tne contrary e/cep1 tc s*a e tha' \(\r 
Duke was "confused." The Panel finds that the OPC met its burden of proof to support 
a violation by Mr. Bowen of this rule. By the use of an "of counsel" relationship on his 
letterhead with an attorney when, in fact, he did not have such a relationship, Mr. 
Bowen violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads). 
(Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)) 
6. Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) states that " . . .a 
lawyer... in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not. . . knowingly fail to respond 
to a lawful demand for information from . . . disciplinary authority, except that this Rule 
does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." 
7. The representation made at the Screening Panel Hearing consisted 
mainly of a concern producing records in violation of Rule 1.6, confidentiality of client 
matters and pending litigation between the Complainant and respondent. The Panel 
considered the arguments regarding Rule 1.6 and pending litigation. However, with 
respect to those records that were clearly not related to client confidentiality (Rule 1.6), 
or the pending litigation (which the Panel questions to be a valid excuse), Mr. Bowen 
failed to provide them to OPC when requested to do so. Some of the specific 
documents that the Panel discovered existed, but were not provided to OPC would 
have been helpful to OPC and to the Panel if provided before the Hearing, or, for some, 
if provided at all. Additionally, form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations 
of failure to disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance 
purchased by clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Pane!. 
Although Mr. Bowen did leave with the Panel a stack of records that were represented 
to be these disclosures the Panel could not consider the additional documents as a 
basis for its decision. When the documents were provided, the hearing had concluded 
and the complainants were leaving. 
8. The Panel was concerned that documents, such as forms of client 
disclosures were not provided to OPC. The Panel felt that a strategy of "stonewalling" 
was used so not to provide requested information to the OPC in defense of the 
allegations against Mr. Bowen. However, the Panel recognized the arguments that 
appeared to have been brought in good faith by counsel for not producing some 
documents. The documents not related to client confidences should have been 
produced as requested. The Panel finds that this disciplinary' process was substantially 
impeded as a result of the failure to provide documents to OPC. By failing to provide 
certain documents requested by the OPC in this disciplinary matter, Mr. Bowen violated 
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters). 
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct)) 
9. Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) states that "It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the 
aforementioned Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 8.4(a) 
(Misconduct). 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Travis Bowen 
be publicly reprimanded for violation 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General 
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a. Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names 
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct), Rules of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
It is the intent of the Panel for the four cases against the respondent to be 
consolidated into one case only. The facts and circumstances arise out of common 
and connected events with the same complainants". Therefore, the Panel intends to 
find only one instance of a violation for each rule. 
G 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify thai on this KM-h day of •JK.JH , 2006, I sent via 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Travis Bowen 
c/o Gregory Skordas 
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C. 
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard Smurthwaite 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Trevin G. Workman 
503 West 2600 South 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Keith A Kelly 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Michael C. Walch 
Gateway Tower, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Gregory G Skordas (#3865) 
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE 
Attorney for Petitionei 
9 Exchange Place. Suite ] 104 
Salt Lake City, UT 84] 11 
Tel. 801.531.7444 
Fax 801.531 8885 
D^  THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Travis Bowen. 
Petitioner. 
v. 
The Utah State Bar 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 060912210 
Judge Lindberg 
Petitioner. Travis Bov/en. by and through counsel, hereby submits this Motion foi a 
Preliminan' Injunction against the Office of Professional Conduct for printing a public reprimand 
against Petitionei. for the reasons and arguments articulated in the supporting memorandum filed 
contemporaneous!} herewith 
i 
DATED this 4~ da> of August. 2006 
— • / ) 
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE 
Gieghr>yj Sl^ ordas 
Attonje^for Petitioner. Travis Bo wen 
Certificate of Mailing 
1. the undersigned, hereby by state under penalty of perjury that ] caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, pre-postage paid, first class mail to: 
Diana Akiyama 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, UT, 8411] 
Dated this MVV\, day of August 2006. 
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Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
9 Exchange Place. Suite 11 04 
Salt Lake City, UT 84]]] 
Tel. 801.531.7444 
Fax. 801.531.8885 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Travis Bowen, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
The Utah State Bar 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDAUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 060912210 
Judge Lindberg 
Petitioner. Travis Bowen. by and through his counsel of record, Gregory G. Skordas. 
pursuant to Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves this Court for a 
Preliminary Injunction against the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
prohibiting the printing of a public reprimand against Petitioner. 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorney Travis Bowen ("Bowen") received notice from the Office of Professional 
Conduct ("OPC") that four complaints had been filed against him by former employees of his 
law firm. Mr. Bowen responded to the complaints, and a hearing was scheduled on January 19, 
2006: before Screening Panel CI of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. After the hearing, the 
committee recommended public reprimand as discipline for allegedly violating the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. On March 13, 2006. Petitioner provided written notice of the exception to 
the public reprimand to the OPC, pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability. The Committee Chair adopted the recommendation of the Screening Pane] and 
ordered a public reprimand against Petitioner. 
Travis Bowen filed a petition in Third District Court for a de novo review of the OPC 
issuance of the public reprimand. To prevent the OPC from carrying out its disciplinary action 
before Mr. Bowen has the opportunity to challenge the Screening Panel and the Committee 
Chair's Findings of Fact, Mr. Bowen seeks a preliminary injunction. 
ARGUMENT 
A. AN IMMEDIATE INJUNCTION AGAINST THE OPC IS NECESSARY TO 
ALLOW FOR PROPER JUD1C1AL REVIEW OF THE AGENCY'S FINAL 
DECISI ON A GAINST PETIT! ONER. 
Mr. Bowen requests that the Court issue a preliminary injunction to bar the OPC from 
printing a public reprimand in the quarterly bar journal, denying Mr. Bowen of the relief sought 
in this matter. Following a hearing before a Screening Pane! and filing an exception to the 
Committee Chair, the OPC issued an order stating the}' would be publishing a public reprimand 
against Mr. Bowen However. Mr Bo wen has filed a Petition for Judicial P.eview in the above 
captioned case in order to seek review oi the evidence supporting the OPC's decision (a petition 
to review by trial de novo pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l 5j. Because proper relief in 
Petitioner's claim against the Office of Professional Counsel ("OPC") cannot be given once the 
OPC has published a public reprimand against Petitioner, this Court should issue a preliminary 
injunction against the OPC from doing so. 
Under Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction may be 
issued upon a showing of the following: 
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the party enjoined; 
(3) The injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest: and 
(4) There is substantia] likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of 
the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits which 
should be the subject of further litigation. 
See Ut R. Civ. Pro 65A(e; (2004). 
Each of these factors aie discussed below, demonstrating to the Court the justification of 
issuing a pieliminan injunction against the OPC. 
(1) Mr, Bowen will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction h ordered 
Once the OPC publishes a public reprimand against Mr. Bowen. Petitioner will not be 
able to repau the damage to his reputation and image as an attorney '"Irreparable harm.5' a term 
often interchanged with ''irreparable injur)1,5' is defined as "a harm that a court would be unable 
to remedy even if the movant would prevail m the final adjudication." Johnson v Hermes 
Association, Ltd. 2005 UT 82 ^ 2, ]28 P.3d 1151. Irreparable injury consists of ^wrongs of a 
repeated and continuing character, or which occasion damages that are estimated only by 
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard"'' Carrier v. Lindqiast, 2001 UT ]05, % 26; 37 P.3d 
1112 ('interna] quotation marks omittedj. A party proves irreparable injur)- when establishing 
that "he or she is unlikely to be made whole by an award of monetary damages or some other 
legal, as opposed to equitable, remedy •• thus, an injur)7 is irreparable if the damages are 
estimable only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard.3*' 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 33 
(2004); see also Carrier, 2001 UT 105, <fl 26, 37 P.3d 1112. 
In the present case. Mr. Bowen will suffer irreparable harm unless the Court issues a 
preliminary injunction. The OPC has expressed to Mr. Bowen's counsel they intend to publish 
the public reprimand even if a petition for judicial review is filed. If a public reprimand is 
published. Mr. Bowen will lose credibility within his profession and suffer consequences in 
terms of his reputation. The Utah State Bar publishes a journal that is sent to each member of the 
bar ever)' three months. In the Discipline Comer, the bar publishes an account of attorneys who 
have been found to have violated the ethical rules. Attorneys can be admonished (their names 
are excluded from the publication) or publicly reprimanded (their names are listed). Indeed, 
statements included in publications such as the Utah Bar Journal are, by their very nature, 
irreversible. 
Unless a preliminary injunction is granted by the Court, the OPC will publish an account 
of the ethical rules Mr. Bowen is alleged to have violated, along with his full legal name. If 
publication occurs and Mr. Bowen is successful in his petition, monetary damage would be based 
on pure conjecture as to the amount of damage Mr. Bowen reputation and goodwill had suffered. 
His injur)' would be irreparable: his injuries could not be compensated by monetary means. Il is 
unlikely that Mr. Bowen could be made whole by an award of monetary damages Therefore, 
Mr. Bowen requests that the Court find that Mr. Bowen has proven this element of the standard, 
and ultimately issue a preliminary injunction. 
(2) injury to Mr. Bowen clearlv outweighs any damage to the OPC 
Mr. Boweir s irreparable harm clearly outweighs the minor inconvenience the OPC may 
encounter. If this Court grants an injunction the OPC will only be inconvenienced in that they 
will have to delay publication until Mr. Bowen has the opportunity to exhaust the court system. 
Should Petitioner be successful in his review, then there will be no harm because the Court will 
have determined that a reprimand was not warranted. Should Petitioner be unsuccessful, the 
OPC can simp])' publish the public reprimand in the following issue of the Utah Bar Journal. 
Thus, an}' argument thai the Office of Professional Counsel is damaged by an injunction is 
meritless. 
(3j The injunction would not be adverse to the public interest 
An injunction against publication would not be adverse to the public interest. Rather, the 
injunction would serve the public interest by allowing for proper judicial review of a final 
agenc} decision While public reprimands are published in the Utah Bar Journal to inform others 
of what has occurred, the)' are not emergency notifications meant to deter the public from 
involving themselves with the attorney. Thus, even if the Court ultimate]}' concludes that a 
public remand is proper, the public will not be harmed if the information is withheld for a short 
period of time. 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Bcrvven will prevail on the merits of 
the underlying claim, and the case presents serious issues on the merits which 
should be the subject of further litigation 
Finally, there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner will prevail on the merits of ihe 
underlying claim, because the findings of facts are supported by disgruntled formei employees of 
Mr. Bowen and hearsay statements. Under the applicable statute, Petitioner is entitled to a de 
novo trial on the OPC's findings. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Thus, the Petitioner will be 
given full opportunity to argue his claims. As outlined in the Petition's Petition for Judicial 
Review, the OPC's findings are unsupported by the facts and cannot be justified under the 
applicable law. 
The bar complaints at issue in the below proceeding were filed by former employees oi 
Mr Bowen. not clients of Mr. Bowen. The OPC's Findings of Fact to support the order for a 
public reprimand is based upon the testimony of these former employees who misappropriated 
intellectual properties belonging to Mr. Bowen's firm. At the time the bar complaints weie filed, 
there was a pending lawsuit in the Third District Court between the parties MJ . Bowen alleges 
in the complaint that the former employees breached their fiducian duty to Mr. Bowen's law 
firm and misappropriated the law firm's intellectual property The OPC did not consider the 
hostile relationship between the complamtants and Mr. Bowen when the Screening Panel made 
their findings of fact!, 
The OPC carries the burden of a preponderance of the evidence to establish that Mr. 
Bowen violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The information used to support the 
complaints filed with the bar are support by hearsay statements by these former employees. 
The OPC's alleges. 
1. Violation of 1.5(a) (Fees): The OPC found that Mr. Bowen charged excessive fees, 
however, these issues were raised by formei employees, not clients. However. Mr Bowen 
charged his fees in accordance to the local customs, and often exchanged goods in exchange of 
legal sendees to accommodate clients' needs. However, the findings of fact do not oppose Mr. 
Bowen's argument that the fees were reasonable in light of the nature of the work performed. 
2. Violation of 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest) The OPC also alleges that Mr. Bowen 
violated Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest by not disclosing the nature of his relationship with 
Business Consulting. Mr. Bowen did make these disclosures. Furthermore, Mr. Bowen's 
actions were m accordance with Ethics Opinion Nos. 04-05. 98-08 and 99-07. The lav, firm's 
clients were informed of the relationship between Business Consultants and Mr. Bowen's lavs 
firm and Mr Bowen has filed the Petition in the above refeienced case in order refute the 
Screening Panel's findings of fact. 
3 Violation of Rule 7.] (a; (Communication concerning a lawyer's service). It is alleged 
thai Mr. Boven"i letterhead is '"misleading/* however, his letterhead listed even attorne) who 
had a relationship with the law firm and indicated which states these attorne} *s held licenses 
The law firm traveled to other states in order to give seminars in the areas of estate planning, 
asset management, and tax issues. This did nol constitute the practice of law. and the letterhead 
was only indicative of the law firm's activities in other states. 
4. Violation of Rule 7.5(a) and (d) (Finn Names and Letterhead). Every attorney who 
was listed on Mr. Bowen :s letterhead had a relationship with the law firm and was licensed 10 
practice law in any state so indicated. Mr. Bowen knows of no requirement where an attorney 
must have an office in every state in which he is licensed. In addition, contrary to the OPC's 
findings. Mr. Duke had an appropriate relationship with the firm and therefore it was proper to 
list Mr. Duke as "of counsel" on the firm's letterhead. Please note that Mr. Duke is also listed as 
"of counsel" on the complaintants letterhead. 
5. Violation of Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct). In light of the findings that Mr. Bowen 
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct the OPC added this violation. Additionally, the OPC 
requested certain documents held by Mr. Bowen. however, due to the attorney-client privilege, 
Mr. Bowen was not capable of turning the documents over to the OPC. The OPC classified this 
action as "impeding" the investigation. 
It is clear that the OPC relied upon the testimony of disgruntled former attorneys who 
were also being sued by Mr. Bowen to find ethical violations by Mr. Bowen. In a de novo 
review of the evidence, once all hearsay evidence is cast aside:. no evidence will be left to 
support the OPC's findings of fact. 
Furthermore, the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be subject to 
further litigation. Petitioner intends to appeal to the Utah Supreme Court if necessary, the issue 
of whether informal administrative sanctions brought undei Plule lOfbjfSjfE) of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability violate the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the case 
carries with it a significant importance which should not be disturbed by allowing the OPC to 
inflict irreparable harm on the Petitioner before the Court is able to hear the merits of case 
Based on the aforementioned arguments. Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to 
grant a preliminary injunction against the Office of Professional Conduct until the underlying 
claim is resolved. 
DATED this _ 4 day of August. 2006. 
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE 
JL 
Gregory t r Skordas 
Attorney for Petitioner. Travis Bo wen 
Certificate of Mailing 
L the undersigned, hereby state under penalty of perjury that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be mailed, pre-postage paid, first class mail to: 
Diana Akiyama 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205 
Salt Lake City? UT, 8411] 
Dated this (A%\ day of August, 2006. 
Third Judicial District 
TRAVIS BOWEN, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
v . 
UTAH STATE EAR, 
Responden t . 
OCT 1/J006 
SALT^KfcqoWTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT BgQLTRJL 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Deputy Clerk 
jJ MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER 
Case No. 060912210 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
Date: October 17, 2006 
j^l This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civi] Procedure 7. Having considered the memoranda 
submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Petitioner's Motion should be DENIED and Respondent's 
Motion should be GRANTED. 
1^2 On July 25, Petitioner brought his Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order, to challenge 
Respondent's determination, through informal procedures, that Petitioner should receive a public reprimand 
for certain violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility. Petitioner asserts that he entitled to 
review in district court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-l 5. which allows an individual to obtain 
review of an informal agency adjudication tiuough a trial de novo in district court. Because, he believes 
he is entitled to review. Petitioner argues that a preliminary injunction is necessary to keep the Bar from 
publishing his reprimand before the Court has the opportunity to afford him a trial de novo. In response, the 
Bar argues that it is not a state agency and that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Bar's 
informal disciplinary procedures. 
Tj3 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A governs preliminary injunctions. It provides that a preliminary 
injunction may issue only upon a showing by the applicant that; 
(!) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction 
issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; 
and 
(4) There is a substantia] likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits 
of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits 
which should be the subject of further litigation. 
hah R. Civ. p. 65A('ej. Although the Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied the first three 
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because there is not a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the 
underlying claim for the reasons detailed below. Specifically, the Court agrees with Respondent that 
this Court is without jurisdiction to review informal State Bar actions. Thus, while this case appears 
to present a serious issue on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation, that litigation 
cannot proceed w this cowl on the asserted basis for jurisdiction.1 
^4 First, contrary to Petitioner's argument the Court concludes it does not have jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Arm. § 63-46b-l 5 because the Utah State Bar is not a "stale agency.5' Although 
this issue appears to be a question of first impression, there are a number of indications in Utah law 
that the State Bar is not a "slate agency." First Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 outlines the jurisdiction 
of the district courts. Section 78-3-4(3) says that "The district court has jurisdiction over all mailers 
of lawyer discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.'" while subsection (7) confers 
jurisdiction upon district courts to review agency adjudicative proceedings. This implies that agency 
proceedings are different than lawyer discipline proceedings. Second. Utah case law has said that 
review of State Bar actions is different than review of administrative decisions. See In re Discipline 
ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997) ("it is imperative to bear in mind that the review of 
attorney discipline proceedings is fundamentally different from judicial review of administrative 
proceedings or of other district court cases." Internal citations and quotations omitted.)). Finally and 
most persuasively, in Barnard v. Utah Stale Bar. 804 P.2d 526 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the Utah State Bar is not a "state agency" within the scope and meaning of the Records Act 
and the Writings Act. While the Barnard Court specifically stated that it was not deciding whether 
the Utah State Bar was a "state agency" for any other purpose, such as the federal Civil Rights Act 
{id. at 527). its reasoning is persuasive here. Since the statutory provision authorizing judicial review 
of state agency action is" inapplicable here, the proposed Bar sanction cannot be brought for court 
review under Section 63~46b-15. 
T|5 Second, the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability specifically foreclose a district 
court from reviewing this Bar decision. Rule 10 governs prosecution and appeals. It provides that 
a disciplinary proceedings is begun by filing an informal complaint. See R. 1 0(a)(1). Following 
investigation and attempts to resolve the complaint, if the complaint is not dismissed, it goes before 
a screening panel for a hearing. See R. 10(b). Following the hearing, the screening panel makes a 
determination that sanctions are not warranted, to impose a form of discipline (with public reprimand 
being the most severe sanction), or to file a formal complaint against the respondent with the district 
court. Id. If the screening panel recommends public reprimand, the respondent may file an 
exception with the Committee chair and the chair will review the exception and determine whether 
to uphold the recommendation of the screening panel. See R. 10(c). If the Committee chair affirms 
the decision of the screening panel, there is no other review process provided. However, if the panel 
decides to file a formal complaint, then the district court will review the complaint, hold hearings. 
1
 The Court expresses no view on whedier tiiere is 2 substantial likelihood that Peutioner will 
prevail on the merits of his underlying clairo if 2. pennon is properlv raised before the Ltah Supreme 
r,nnrr The- Oniri oniv finds dial PeuDoner cannot prevail on this Petition because this Court 
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etc. and enter a decision. The district court's decision is then subject to review- by the Utah Supreme 
Court. See Rule ]]/ 
ORDER 
<\\6 Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Preview of 
Administrative Order, and is foreclosed by Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability from reviewing disciplinary sanctions imposed following an informal process, the Court 
must DENY Petitioner's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and GRANT Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review. 
Entered by the Court this j_Z^ day of October, 2006. __ 
2
 As noted above, tins matte]: has been pursued under OPCs informal process sanctioned by 
Rule 1 0 and, as a result, Petitioner has no right to obtain judicial review of the proposed sanction in 
any court. Since Petitioner does not appear to have available to him any other "plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy/' it may well be drat Petitioner's only option is to seek relief directly from the Utah 
Supreme Court 
Although Petitioner has not expressly raised a Due Process argument, die Court is troubled 
by die fact dial die Rules authorize a public reprimand as a possible sanction in both formal and 
informal disciplinary proceedings, but judicial review is only available if that sanction is imposed in a 
formal proceeding. What's more, it appears that OPC has die exclusive authority to determine 
whether to msurute formal proceedings. Sec Rules 10. J \. Utah Rulei of Laywer Discipline and 
r-nc<,;-,-.nm- Lr o ir.inimiiiT; rm< i< or- issue that should receive further examination bv the appropriate 
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Mail THE UTAH STATE EAR 
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Mail GREGORY G SKORDAS 
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Suite 1104 Boston Bui J ding 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801)531-7444 
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Attome) for Petitionei 
IN THE THIRD 1UDIC1AL DISTRICT COURT 
Dx1 AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
Ti avis Bow en, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
v
 J 
The Utah State Bar, 
Respondent ] 
) Petitioner's Notice of Withdrawal 
) Civil No 060912210 
) Judge Denise Lmdberg 
Tiavis Bow en, by and thiough lus attorney of tecoid, Gregory G Skordas hereby 
withdraws his Petition Foi Judicial Review of Adniimstiative Ordei m the above entitled mattci 
on the following gi ounds 
SUMMARY OF RELE> ANT F4CTS 
On lanuary 19, 2006 Petitionei appealed befoie a Scieemng Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Utah Supi erne Court fthe "Scj eemng Panel") One of the tin ee 
rtCElVED 
. M c /00C 
o=Hp-: or 
'
JriOFEf SIGNAL W.VOL 
pane] members was Christine Greenwood, of Magleby & Greenwood P.C.] Ms. Greenwood's 
partner and the registered agent for Greenwood & Magleby is James E. Magleby. Mr. Magelby 
is the lead counsel for plaintiff in Neff'v. Ncff el. ai, case number 030100275, pending in the lsl 
District Coun., State of Utah, before Judge Low, m which Petitioner is a named defendant. Ms. 
Greenwood did not disclose that her law firm was currently representing the plaintiff in a million 
dollar lawsuit against him. 
The Screening Panel made findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that 
Petitioner had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Screening Panel voted to 
publically reprimand Petitioner. Counsel for Travis Bowen requested an exception to the 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Panel to the Committee Chair. The 
Committee Chair adopted the Screening Panel's findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommendation of public reprimand On July 7, 2006. Petitioner received the Final Order . 
On July 25, 2006, he petitioned this Court for review of the Screening Panel's findings 
and the Order for public reprimand. Petitioner requested an order from this Court prohibiting 
the Office of Professional Conduct, Utah State Bar, (the "OPC") from publishing the reprimand 
until after he had the benefit of judicial review of the Screening Panel's findings. 
On August 15, 2006, the OPC filed a motion to dismiss claiming that this Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction and that Petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
On September 1, 2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to the OPC's motion to dismiss, 
arguing that he was entitled to judicial review of the Screening Panel's findings prior to issuance 
1
 Magleby & Greenwood has been registered with the Utah Department of Commerce 
since January 26, 2005. 
of the public remand. The OPC replied on Seplembei 8, 2006 and on September 12, 2006 filed a 
request to submit for decision. 
After all of the pleadings had been filed, while the matter was pending before this Court, 
the OPC published the reprimand m the September/October edition of the Utah Bar Journal, 
without regard for this Court's ability and authority to decide the matter for itself 
On September 19, 2006, just a few short days after the OPC published the public 
reprimand in the Bar Journal, Mr. Magelby appeared before Judge Low to argue against 
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment in the Neffv. Neff'case. Magleby produced a copy of 
the Bar Journal and argued that the public reprimand was evidence of Petitioner's dishonesty and 
should be considered by the court in denying the motion for summary judgment. On October 45 
2006, Magleby motioned the court to supplement the record with the public reprimand. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner sought judicial intervention from this Court asking for an order prohibiting the 
OPC from publishing the public reprimand until he could obtain review of the Screening Panel's 
findings. Before this Court could decide the jurisdictional issues raised by the parties, the OPC 
published the reprimand. Within days, the partner of the one of the Screening Panel members 
used the reprimand in litigation against Petitioner that had been pending during the disciplinary 
proceedings. 
The OPC's actions indicate that it does not recognize the authority of this Court to 
resolve the jurisdictional and legal issues raised by Petitioner and is under no obligation to await 
its ruling on the matter. The OPC noted m its Memorandum m Support of Motion to Dismiss 
thai the Utah Supreme Court has authority to regulate the practice of law. including discipline of 
attorneys few pi ofessional misconduct A.ccojdingly Petitioner Jespcctfull) withdiaws his 
Petition foi iclief from this Court and will file with the Utah Supieme Court for levies of 
OPC s actions m this case 
DATED this / 6 day of October, 2006 
SKORD AJS C^S?ON & HYDE 
Grtejgory G Skordas 
All<|ntey far Petitioner 
rF.RTTFICATF OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby state undei penalty of perjury that 1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be mailed, pre-postage paid, first class mail to: 
Kate Toomey 
Billy Walker 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205 
Sail Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this \r-\ day of October, 2006 
. 0 ) ^ ^ i )AV^c^^/d 
Kathenne A Fox f527B, 
General Counsel 
Utan Staie Bai 
045 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 
Telephone (801)297-7047 
Fa/ (801)531-0050 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
In Re ) 
) Petition IO Amend me Rules of 
Utah State Bar ) Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
) 
Petitioner ) 
) 
THE UTAH STATE BAR by and through its General Counsel Kathenne A Fox 
hereby petmons the Court to amend the Rules for Lawyer Discipline and Disability (the 
"Rules") The proposed changes encompass editing changes for clarity and interna! 
consistency as well as more substantive revisions to improve the disciplinary process 
Foi the Court's convenient reference, an addendum which accompanies this petition 
contains a copy of the current Rules, a copy of the re'dlme version of the Rules and a 
copy of the final veision of the Rules wrtn the pioposed modifications incorporated ""^ ne 
proposed changes weie posted foi several months on tne Bar s weo site and member 
comment was invited As of tne deadline of January 31 2002 two comments weie 
suomitred botn of wnich nave been included in tne addendum 
BACKGROUND 
The Utah Supreme Court approved the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
in May 1993 when the disciplinary system) was modified to delegate authority to the 
state district courts instead of the Board of Bar Commissioners (the "Commission") in 
order to adjudicate formal complaints against attorneys 1 In recommiending adoption of 
the Rules to the Court, the Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional 
Conduct contemplated that the disciplinary rules would need revision from time to time, 
and in fact, the Rules have been periodically amended/ 
Beginning in 1998 James C. Jenkins, President of the Bar, met with Office of 
Professional Conduct Senior Counsel Billy L. Walker to explore the feasibility of several 
amendments to streamline and decrease the cost of the disciplinary process. The 
Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"; had previously reviewed the Rules and arrived 
at a number of suggestions to clarify aspects of the disciplinary process, address 
problems relating to the 1993 Rules that had surfaced, incorporate selected language 
taken from the ABA Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement and generally 
make the disciplinary process .more efficient. In the spring of 2000, the Commission 
discussed the suggested changes, but required additional information to make a final 
The new Rules became effective July 1, 1993 and replaced the former Proceduies of Discipline 
" Since 1993, tne followinci Rules have been amended as follows Rule 3 (Etnics and Discipline 
Committee) to a3d provisions foi alternates on screening panels or March 26 1995, Rule 3 (Etnics and 
Discipline Committee; ic increase tne number of alternates serving on screening panels on Decembei 25 
1997 Rule 3 (Etnics anc Discipline Committee; to increase numoer of screening pane! puoiic members 
on January 26, 1999, Rule 3 (Ethics anc Discipline Committee; to change tne Office of Professional 
Conduc* Annua' Reoor- dje caie or Way '5, 2000 Ruie 4 (Office of Pioiessiona. Concjjc* Counsel/to 
cnange titles of Office of Attorn e\ Discipline to Office o Drofessionat Conduc anc Cnief Disciplinary 
Counse tc 3emo- Counse on Decemoe" 2c "99" anc Aon 8 "998 anc Rule 8 Pencci: Assessnen of 
_3vye-s tc "eins;a"£ oeiinouen' tee to- suspenoec attorneys or Aon "6 "999 
VIC 
appp 
^ n a t i o n .n the fa. Bar President Dav,d Mufler appointed a Rules Review 
Subcommittee (the -Subcommittee-, consisting of Commissioners John A Adams. 
commendations to the Commission for overall improvement. The Subcommittee me, 
numerous times, and a. times included Biily L. WaiKer. James B Lee, Ethics and 
Disciplinary Committee chair, and R. Clark Arnold, Ethics and Disciplinary Committee 
;6-chair. in several of those meetings. The proposed modifications to the P.uies which 
, , . * . „ pytersive review and discussion at regularly 
ar below were approved atter exiensix 
I P ii.u. 4 IHIV ?7 Auqust 24 and December 
scheduled Commission meetings on June 6, July 4, July - / , Aug 
7,2001. 
The contents of this petition are organized to reflect ho* the four components of 
changes to the "table of contents," the "compiler's notes" and the -summary.' aii of 
wh icn precede the Rules ,n the Code, are listed before the proposed amendments to 
Model Poles for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, the same has been noted. F i n * , 
care has been taken to identify proposed changes which are, or even could be 
r,Hin-.irh^as°s an asterisk appears before 
considered to be, substantive in naiure and in ,uch -as.s, 
the particular Rule. 
THE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 
Rule 30 (Costs) 
* Rule 30: Editing change reflects a proposed substantive change in Rule 30. 
The title of Rule 30 in the table of contents has been modified to aad "attorneys fees" to 
evidence the proposed change that grants the district court discretion to award attorney 
fees against a respondent when the defense was without merit and not asserted in good 
faith. (For a more complete description of the changes, see the explanation below 
under Rule 30 in the Rules section.) 
Rule 32 (Failure to answer charges) 
* Rule 32(a) and (b): Editing change in the table of contents reflects the proposed 
addition of a new Rule. Rule 32(a) provides that at the screening panel level, a 
respondent's failure to answer charges which have been filed constitutes an admission 
of the allegations but only if actual notice was received. Rule 32(b) provides that failure 
to appear before a screening panel hearing, after receipt of actual notice, constitutes an 
admission of the allegations. (For a more complete description of the changes, see the 
explanation below, under Rule 32 in the Rules section.) 
THE COMPILER'S NOTES SECTION 
Compilers Notes: No changes 
/ 
THE SUMMARY SECTION 
Summary: Editing changes only; adds numeric equivalents for the words 
"three" and "four." 
THE RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY 
Rule 1 (Purpose, authority, scope and structure 
of lawyer discipline and disability) 
Rule 1(a): No changes. 
Rule 1(b): Editing changes only; spells out the abbreviated word "art." and 
substitutes the word "section" in lieu of the section symbol (§) which appears in the 
current Rule. 
Rule 1(c): No changes. 
Rule 1(d): No changes. 
Rule 2 (Definitions) 
Rule 2(a): No changes. 
Rule 2(b): No changes 
Rule 2(c): No changes. 
Rule 2(d): Editing changes oniy; adds '!OPC" tc the definition of "complainant" 
in mailers where OPC determines to open an investigation based on information it 
receives. Trie change is needed 10 codify what already occurs in practice and provides 
consistency with current Rule 10(a)(1) which authorizes, in part, OPC counsel to initiate 
an informal complaint against an attorney for misconduct. 
Rule 2(e): Editing changes only; adds a definition for OPC "Senior Counsel" 
and further refines the definition of "OPC Counsel." 
Rule 2(f): No changes. 
Rule 2(g): No changes. 
* Rule 2(h): Both substantive and editing change; provides a definition for the 
currently existing "NOIC5) or "Notice of Informal Complaint" referenced in Rule 10. 
Rule 2(i): Editing changes only; replaces the term "OPC" with the word "Office" 
since the "Office" referred to throughout the Rules is the Bar's Office of Professional 
Conduct. Change also re-numbers subsection to accommodate new subsection (h) 
above. 
Rule 2(j): Editing change only; re-numbers subsection to accommodate new 
subsection (h) above. 
Rule 2(k): Editing change only; re-numbers subsection to accommodate new 
subsection (h) above. 
Rule 3 (Ethics and discipline committee) 
Rule 3(a): Editing changes only; spells out the number "26" and provides 
numeric equivalents for numerous spelled-out numbers for clarification purposes. 
Rule 3(a)(1): No changes 
o 
Rule 3(b): Editing changes only; replaces the word "base" with the more 
appropriate word "basis" and clarifies that the "chair" referenced in this subsection is the 
chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee versus a screening panel chair. 
Rule 3(c): Editing changes only; clarifies that the "vice chair,! referenced in this 
subsection is the vice chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee versus a screening 
panel vice chair. 
* Rule 3(dJ: Both substantive and editing changes; substantive amendments 
provide that when a screening panel of four members is convened, the chair or vice 
chair of a Ethics and Discipline screening panel shall act as a tie-breaker. Currently., the 
number for a quorum is four and consists of three members of the Bar and one pubiic 
member. There are no tie breaking procedures and OPC has had at least one instance 
where a screening panel voted in a tie which resulted in no decision. The proposed 
revisions also change the number of Committee members required to constitute a 
quorum to three persons consisting of two Bar members and one pubiic member. The 
number three instead of five is suggested because it is easier to convene a smaller 
number of people than a larger number.. Editing changes aiso correct the misspelling of 
the word "or" to "of," make the word "member" plural where needed, and provide 
numeric equivalents for numerous spelled out numbers. Finally, while proposed 
revisions do not increase the actual number of public members on the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee, the four screening panels are now organized with two public 
members instead of one. 
Ruie 3(d)(1): Editing changes only; capitalizes the first letter of the word 
"committee" in three different places to make clear reference is being made to the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee outlined in Rule 3. 
Rule 3(e): Editing changes only; proposed revisions substitute the abbreviated 
term "OPC" for the word disciplinary" which is more consistent with the prior name 
change of "Office of Attorney Discipline" to "Office of Professional Conduct/' In addition, 
reference to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct has been made because those 
rules provide the basis upon which an attorney should conform his or her conduct. 
* Ruie 3(f): Substantive change; this subsection has been deleted and 
reformulated into other more detailed subsections which appear below as Rule 3(f)(1) 
through (4). Rule 3(f) as currently written allows any party or a screening panel to 
request under seal of the court a subpoena allowing discovery prior to the filing of a 
formal complaint (with a five day notice generally being issued). One reason OPC 
seldom uses this Rule is that it is unduly cumbersome. When used by the respondent 
or complainants, however, the informal disciplinary process is often diverted to 
irrelevant issues and the entire process is delayed. 
* Rule 3(f)(1): Substantive change; the proposed amendments grant the power to 
OPC counsel to issue investigatory subpoenas 'with the approval of the chair of the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee. The change and the language is, in large part, based 
on Ruie 14 of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement promulgated by the 
ABA's Center for Professional Responsibility. These changes are sougnt to improve 
efficiency and to reduce the cost of the investigatory process in discipline mailers. 
Currently, prior io filing a forma! complaint for good cause shown, subpoenas can be 
obtained by any party who files a petition under seal with the district court. When used, 
this process can slow down case processing by allowing complainants and/or 
respondents to divert the informal disciplinary process to tangential issues. The 
proposed language is feasible because prior to the filing of formal changes, the 
disciplinary process is more an administrative-type investigation, investigatory 
subpoenas only will be obtained when independent evidence is needed (e.g., bank 
records) that the respondent or complainant is unwilling to provide to OPC or where 
there are unwilling witnesses who refuse to testify. As a safeguard OPC counsel may 
only use the subpoena power with the approval of the Ethics and Discipline Committee 
Chair. 
* Rule 3(f)(2) and (3) and (4): Substantive changes; the Utah Pxules of Civil 
Procedure and in particular, Rule 45 governing subpoenas, witness fees and mileage 
reimbursement, will-now apply under these proposed revisions. Enforcement of the 
subpoena can be sought through the district court. The respondent or complainant is 
protected in that he or she is accorded the right to file a motion to quash the subpoena if 
its appropriateness or validity is questioned. 
± Rule 3(g): Substantive and editing changes; editing changes substitute the term 
'OPC" for the word "disciplinary" in three places for reason stated above in proposed 
changes to Rule 3(e). The reference to word "time" should be plural (i.e., "times") to 
make sentence grammatically correct. A more substantive revision also inserts the 
phrase "during a [screening panel] hearing" after the phrase 'screening panel" and 
before the phrase "the respondent . . . ." in the last semence of the first paragraph. This 
is ic clarify -what is already implicit in oractioe: that the respondent has the right xo be 
present during a hearing if OPC is present. A proposed editing amendment also inserts 
the word ,1the,, after the word "of and before the word "subsequenf in the second to last 
iine of the second paragraph for language clarity. Finally, editing-type changes add the 
numeric equivalent of the word "three." 
Rule 3(h): Editing changes only; substitutes the term "OPC" for the word 
"Office" for consistency reasons. A proposed amendment also changes the word 
"ethical" to "ethics11 (as it modifies "opinion") as it is an informal ethics advisory opinion 
that is being referenced. 
Rule 4 (QPC counsel) 
Rule 4(a): Editing changes only; deletes the redundant word "staff" and 
substitutes the word "payment" for the word "profit" since attorneys in OPC should be 
barred from engaging in private practice which could involve conflicts of interest rather 
than be prohibited from engaging in legal service for profit which implies an income 
analysis. 
Rule 4(b) and 4(b)(1) and (2) and (3): Editing changes only; adds the modifier 
"the" in Rule 4(b) and substitutes the term "OPC" for the word "Office" in Rule 4(b)(1) 
and (2) and (3). in subsection 4(b)(3) for consistency purposes, the revision also 
references the proposed changes in Rule 10, i.e., "for each matter not covered in Rule 
10" brought to the attention of OPC. 
Rule 4(b)(3)(A): No changes. 
Rule 4(b)(3)(B): No changes. 
Rule 4(b)(3)(C): No changes. 
J0 
Rule 4(b)(3)(D): Editing change only; makes clear what is already implicit, i.e., 
an OPC petition to transfer attorneys to disability status must be fiied in the district 
court. 
* Rule 4(b)(4): Substantive change; defines the duties of OPC counsel to include 
prosecuting disciplinary matters and proceedings for transfer to disability status before 
any court (which would include the federal courts). 
* Rule 4(b)(5): Substantive changes; more accurately details that OPC should 
"attend" Character and Fitness Committee proceedings rather than actually "represent" 
OPC at these proceedings since attendance is needed to gather information for 
subsequent representation of OPC in connection with readmission cases in the district 
court under Ruie 25. Also, changes specify that OPC may appear before any court in 
matters of reinstatement and readmission in order to mirror the proposed changes in 
Rule 4(b)(4) above. 
* Rule 4(b)(6); Both substantive and editing changes; formally adds to the duties 
of OPC counsel the supervision of volunteer attorneys who monitor the practice of 
respondents who have been placed on probation. Editing change also expressly allows 
OPC counsel to "appoint" as well as "employ" these volunteer attorneys as these 
volunteer attorneys are not paid for their oversight responsibilities. 
Rule 4(b)(7): No changes. 
Rule 4(b)(8): Editing change only; more clearly delineates that any discipline 
which has been imposed on an attorney, and of which notice is provided to other 
licensing jurisdictions, must be public discipline. Currently, Ruie 4(b)(8) reads that other 
licensing jurisdictions are notified when a Utah attorney is suspended or disbarred or 
subject to other public discipline. 
Rule 4(b)(9): Editing change only; more clearly delineates that when OPC 
seeks to impose reciprocal discipline, that any discipline imposed by the other licensing 
jurisdiction must be public discipline, e.g., a suspension or disbarment 
* Rule 4(b)(10): Substantive and/or editing change; strikes the seemingly 
superfluous phrase "in other respects." 
* Ruie 4(b)(i1): Substantive and/or editing change; as this Rule currently reads it 
would appear that OPC is required to maintain a permanent record of "transcripts of all 
proceedings," implying that transcripts should be produced in all proceedings so that a 
permanent record can be maintained. The proposed change would seem to indicate 
that only in cases where a transcript is actually produced is OPC under such an 
obligation. 
Rule 4(b)(12): Editing change only; adds numeric equivalent of the word 
"seven," 
Rule 4(b)(12)(A): Editing changes only; replaces the word "office" with the term 
"OPC" and in the word "respondent," replaces the upper case "R" with a lower case V 
Also, this subsection was not specifically numbered before and has now become 
subsection "(A)." 
Rule 4(b)(12)(B): Editing changes only; replaces the word "office" with the term 
"OPC" and in the 'word "expungement," replaces the upper case "E,! with a iower case 
"e,! for consistency purposes. Also, this subsection was not specifically numbered 
before and it now has become subsection "(3)." 
* Rule 4(b)(13): Substantive change: expressly allows OPC to publish results of 
all disciplinary proceedings (while maintaining the confidentiality of respondents subject 
to private discipline) in the Utah Bar Journal which is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in the Pendleton case/ 
Rule 4(b)(14): Editing change only; replaces the word "office" with the term 
"OPC" for consistency purposes. 
* Rule 4(c): Substantive change; this new subsection expressly subjects former 
OPC counsel to Rule 1.11 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct concerning 
successive government and private employment. The proposed change disqualifies 
former OPC counsel from representing in disciplinary proceedings any such lawyer who 
was previously investigated or prosecuted. 
Rule 5 (Expenses) 
Rule 5(a); No changes. 
Rule 5(b): Editing changes only; replaces the phrase "OPC counsel" to "Senior 
Counsel" to more accurately reflects that OPC's Senior Counsel rather than a staff 
attorney should prepare that office's budget. 
Rule 6 (Jurisdiction) 
Rule 6(a): Editing changes; clarifies that OPC"s and the district court's 
jurisdiction extends to formerly admitted Utah lawyers for acts that violate the rules of 
any disciplinary authority where the lawyer was licensed at the time of committing the 
act. The change codifies the intent and understanding that attorneys are subject to 
Utah discipline for alleged misconduct in other states. Editing changes also include 
replacing the word "office" with the term "OPC" and adding the modifier "Supreme" 
before "Court." 
* Rule 6(b): Substantive change; while full-time judges are still only accountable 
to OPC for conduct that occurred prior to their taking of office, after leaving office a 
judge who is also a lawyer will now expressly be subject to OPC for any misconduct that 
occurred while the lawyer was a judge if the misconduct would have been grounds for 
lawyer discipline. Currently, if the Utah Supreme Court makes a final determination 
about a judge's misconduct after the judge left office, even though the misconduct was 
grounds for lawyer discipline, OPC has no jurisdiction. Pursuant to a July 2001 letter 
from the late Senator Pete Suazo to Chief Justice Richard C. Howe and the Judicial 
Council, the Legislature vv/as concerned that when a judge is removed from office, ii did 
not automatically follow that the judge's license to practice law was also affected. 
* Rule 6(c): Substantive change; clarifies that OPC's jurisdiction extends to part-
time judges for acts outside of their judicial capacity. The current Rule does not 
specifically distinguish full-lime incumbent judges who cannot ha^e private legal 
practices from pan-time incumbent judges who can engage in sucn practice. 
Rule 7 (Roster of lawyers) 
Rule 7: Editing changes only; the change from the phrase "OPC counsel" to the 
word "Bar" acknowledges that while OPC is the particular office of the Bar that at times 
needs ready access to the information set forth in this Rule, it is not OPC that collects 
and maintains this information. In fact, as is the case with most integrated or unified bar 
associations the Bars membership record database is maintained by the Ear's financial 
and licensing office. For confidentiality reasons consistent with these Rules, Bar 
policies differentiate between private and public information, and access to private 
information is substantially limited within and without the Bar. No private information is 
disclosed absent certain circumstances such as a decision by a court ordering the Bar 
to release the confidential information pursuant to a subpoena. 
Rule 8 (Periodic assessment of lawyers) 
Rule 8(a): No changes. 
Rule 3(b): Editing changes; minor revision spells out the amount of $100 in 
writing. In addition, the term "Board of Commissioners" is replaced by the word "Bar55 
since the Board other than setting policies, is not involved in the administrative function 
of collecting licensing fees or suspending attorneys for nonpayment. Finally, Rule 8(b) 
now specifies that the Bars Executive Director shall give notice to lawyers of their 
suspension for nonpayment at their designated mailing address on record at the Bar. 
The designated mailing address is the address lawyers specify on the licensing form to 
which they want their mail sent. Currently, the Rule merely states that the Bar shall give 
notice ai the "address on record5' but the Bar collects both home and business 
addresses 
Rule 9 (Grounds for discipline) 
Ruie 9: No changes. 
Rule 9(a): No changes. 
Ruie 9(b): Editing change; proposed amendment strikes the word '"or.'1 
Rule 9(c): Editing change; proposed punctuation change reflects that 
subsection (c) is no longer the last Rule 9 subsection in a series and accommodates the 
addition of new subsections (d), (e) and (f). 
* Rule 9(d) and (e) and (f): Substantive changes; OPC often has a difficult time 
obtaining information relating to: (1) a lawyer's conviction of a crime; (2) a lawyer's 
public discipline in another jurisdiction; and (3) a lawyer's violation of the Rules of 
Judicial Conduct while the lawyer is serving as a judge. New subsections (d) and (e) 
within this Rule provide that a lawyer's failure to notify OPC of the enumerated 
misconduct is in and of itself a ground for discipline. The proposed revisions are, in 
large part, based upon a similar California disciplinary rule and are needed because on 
a prima facia basis, these enumerated circumstances adversely reflect upon a lawyer's 
fitness to practice law in accordance with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Rule 10 (Prosecution and appeals) 
Rule 10(a): No cnanges. 
Ruie 10;aj;1j: Nc changes 
• t 
* Rule 10(a)(2): Both substantive and editing changes; the proposed language 
providing that a person who files a complaint against an attorney must not only have his 
or her signature notarized (which is the current requirement) but also must verify that 
the information contained in the informal complaint is accurate was prompted at the 
urging of Utah Senator Terry R. Spencer. Senator Spencer, who is an active member 
of the Bar, met with the Commission and expressed his concerns about frivolous 
attorney discipline complaints filed by disgruntled clients and others. While Senator 
Spencer suggested a number of ways to reduce on the number of frivolous complaints 
such as requiring the complainant to post a bond, the Commission believes that adding 
the verification language was a reasonable compromise to address Senator Spencers 
concerns and to protect the purpose and integrity of the attorney misconduct complaint 
process. If OPC initiates an investigation as permitted by Rule 4(b) in conjunction with 
Rule 10, this verification is not required since OPC may not have personal knowledge of 
the misconduct but instead, may learn of it from other sources (such as the newspaper). 
The term "OPC" is also substituted for the word "office" in the third line to be consistent 
with the proposed amended definition in Rule 2(h). 
Rule 10(a)(3): No changes. 
Rule 10(a)(4): Editing change only; in order to more accurately caption this 
subsection's content, Rule 10(a)(4)'s title has been changed from "OPC counsel" to 
"Notice of informal complaint." The term "professional" [counsel] has also been 
replaced by the term "OPC" [counsel] for accuracy. 
Rule 10(a)(5): Editing changes only; the numbers 20 and 30 have been spelled 
out. 
* Rule 10(a)(6): Both substantive and editing changes; proposed changes 
embody the idea that the dismissal of disciplinary cases should be based on probability, 
not possibility. The amendments recognize that it is a waste of resources to investigate 
and prosecute cases which are more likely than not to result in ultimate dismissal. In 
addition to complaints which are frivolous, unintelligible and unsupported by facts, 
complaints which are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or which are more 
adequately addressed in another forum should be dismissed.4 These latter two 
concepts are new. Informal complaints which OPC declines to prosecute should also 
be dismissed. This proposed addition codifies QPC's current practice of dismissing 
complaints similar to the way screening panels are authorized to dismiss cases. Finally, 
the proposed amendments clarify that the complainant may appeal all dismissals which 
occur without a hearing to the chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The 
remainder of the changes are minor in nature and are proposed for editing clarification 
and consistency. 
Ruie 10(b): No changes. 
Rule 10(b)(1): No changes. 
Rule 10(b)(2): Editing changes only; spells out the number "14" and provides 
numeric equivalents for the numbers "six" and "five." 
Rule 10(b)(3): No changes. 
Rule 10(b)(4): No changes. 
Rule 10(b)(5): No changes. 
i ne applicable statute of limitations is four years. Examples o~ complaints "more adequately addressed 
if other forums" induce criminal prosecutions and ineffective assistance o"' counsel claims. 
:8 
Rule 10(b)(5)(A) and (3) and (C): No changes. 
Rule 10(b)(5)(D): Editing changes only; adds the numeric equivalent of the 
number "ten." 
± Rule 10(b)(5)(E): Substantive change; this new subsection adds another choice 
that a disciplinary screening panel can make after a hearing. Currently, the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee only has the authority to issue private admonitions. Under this 
new provision the Ethics and Discipline Committee would be given the authority to issue 
public reprimands in addition to private admonitions. Under the current sanctions 
standards the factual basis for a private admonition and a public reprimand is 
essentially the same with the difference being the level of harm to the client, the legal 
profession, or the administration of justice. (See Rule 4.4 and 4.5 of the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.) The change will allow the expedited resolution of similar 
cases because it will eliminate the need to file formal complaints in the district court on 
those cases that are only slightly above the standards for an admonition. This revision 
will also allow OPC to avoid more expensive formal proceedings when the respondent 
is willing to stipulate to a public reprimand and where an admonition does not 
adequately address the conduct. As a practical matter, screening panels rarely, if at all, 
vote a matter "formal" (i.e., find probable cause to send a case to the district court) 
unless they believe the violation warrants suspension or disbarment. This is because 
the time and expense required at the district court level is considerable, and it is often 
difficult to justify the imposition of a "mere" public reprimand. 
Rule 10(b)(5)(F): Editing change only; re-numbers this subsection 
commensurate with tne addition of new subsecxion 10(b)(5)(E) above. 
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Ruie 10(b)(6): Editing change only; adds the numeric equivalent for the number 
"five." 
Rule 10(b)(7): No changes. 
* Rule 10(c): Substantive change; adds "public reprimands" to this subsection to 
provide consistency with the proposed new subsection (10)(b)(5)(E) above vv'hich would 
allow the Ethics and Discipline Committee to issue public reprimands. Minor editing 
change also spells out the number "10." 
Rule 11 (Proceedinas subsequent to finding of probable cause) 
Rule 11{a): No changes. 
Rule 11 (b): Editing change only; expressly states what is allowed under law: 
OPC and the respondent may stipulate to a change in venue under current law (Utah 
Code §78-13-9). 
Rule 11 (c): Editing changes only; replaces the word "Office" with the term 
"OPC" and the term "USB" with the word "Bar" for consistency purposes, 
Rule 11(d): No changes. 
* Rule 11 (d)(1): Substantive change; Rule 11(d)(1) currently reads to permit-
either OPC or a respondent to file a notice of change requesting reassignment to 
another judge in the same - or different - district. The Commission's Subcommittee did 
not v^ant a respondent to avoid publicity relating to the disciplinary proceedings in the 
district where the respondent practices. The proposed change therefore removes 
OPC's and the respondent's option to request reassignment of the disciplinary matter to 
a different judge in another district. There is also a minor editing change which adds the 
numeric equivalent of the number "one.,! 
Rule 11(d)(2): Editing change only; spells out the number "30." 
Rule 11(d)(3): Editing change only; adds the phrase "of the Supreme Court" in 
order to modify "Chief Justice" for clarity and identification purposes. 
Rule 11(d)(4): Editing change only; replaces the lower case "a" to an upper 
case "A" in the reference to "Rule 63a" contained in the title of this subsection. 
Rule 11(e): No changes. 
Rule 11(f): Editing changes; proposed amendment allows -what is implicit in that 
a district court can expedite a sanctions hearing, This subsection addresses what 
happens after a court makes a finding of misconduct and provides that a.sanctions 
hearing should be held as soon as reasonably practicable and not more than thirty days 
after the district court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The intent of this 
subsection is to ensure that the sanctions hearing is separate from the hearing if the 
latter is needed for determining misconduct. However, because of the wording "as soon 
as reasonably practicable," it is somewhat unclear whether the sanctions hearing can 
be held the same day (i.e., in the afternoon) as the hearing for finding misconduct (i.e., 
in the morning). The amendment clearly states that the district court at its discretion 
can hold a sanctions hearing immediately consecutive to the disciplinary proceeding on 
the same day. Editing changes also spell out the number "30" and add the numeric 
equivalent of the number "five." 
* Rule 11(g): Substantive change: proposed amendment broadens the current 
Ruie TO -6cognize trie fact thai district courts may also enter orders of private discipline 
and that both private and public orders of discipline can be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
Rule 12 (Sanctions') 
Rule 12: No changes. 
Rule 13 (Immunity) 
# Rule 13(a): Substantive change; proposed amendment refines the current Rule 
and in this subsection, differentiates between immunity in civil suits and immunity in 
criminal proceedings. The change designates and extends immunity from civil suit to: 
(1) special counsel appointed by the Court under Rule 17(f); (2) supervising attorneys 
who monitor lawyers who have been placed on probation; and (3) trustees appointed by 
a Court under Rule 27 who oversee the closure of a law practice of an attorney who has 
been placed on disability status. The Rule currently provides immunity from lawsuits for 
"statements made during the course of disciplinary proceedings" (comparing the latter to 
judicial proceedings) and is provided to "participants, district courts, committee 
members, and OPC counsel and staff." The current Rule fails, however, to specifically 
include special counsel who perform the identical work of OPC counsel, as well as 
attorneys who supervise lawyers on probation and lawyer trustees. Although the term 
"participants" may have been intended to cover these individuals, the amendment 
makes it clearer. Minor editing changes also provide consistency in terminology. 
* Rule 13(b): Substantive change; this is a new addition which would allow a 
district court, upon notice to and consideration of the position of the prosecuting 
authority, to grant a witness in a disciplinary proceeding immunity from criminal 
prosecution. This change is patterned after the ABA's Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
Model Rule 12 and will aid OPC's investigative efforts by allowing a reluctant witness in 
fear of criminal prosecution to come forth to testify. 
Rule 14 (Service) 
Rule 14: No changes. 
Rule 15 (Access to disciplinary information) 
Rule 15(a): No changes. 
* Rule 15(a)(1): Substantive change; specifies that a respondents waiver of 
confidentiality must be in writing. 
Rule 15(a)(2): No changes. 
Ruie 15(a)(3): Editing change only; replaces a period with a semicolon to reflect 
a continuation of a series of subsections. 
* * Rule 15(b): Substantive change; explicitly recognizes that the filing of a motion 
or petition for interim suspension is a public proceeding absent the exception of 
issuance of a protective order. 
Ruie 15(c) and (d): No changes. 
Rule 15(e): Editing change, minor revisions tighten up the grammatical 
construction of this subsection governing requests for nonpublic (confidential) 
information. 
Rule 15(e)(1): Editing changes only; minor revisions improve clarity and 
readability. 
Rule 15(e)(2): Editing changes only; minor revisions improve clarity and 
readability. 
* Rule 15(f): Substantive change; proposed amendment states that respondents 
shall be notified of requests for nonpublic information at their designated mailing 
address rather than their business office address. As discussed above in Rule 8(b), the 
designated mailing address is the address lawyers specify on the annual licensing form 
to which they want their mail sent. The amendments also require that a respondent's 
waiver to permit others to obtain nonpublic information must be in writing. The 
remainder of the revisions are minor editing changes which improve clarity and 
readability and spell out the number "21." 
* Rule 15(g): Both substantive and editing changes; editing changes improve 
clarity and readability, substantive changes provide that any waivers of confidentiality 
pertaining to subsection (e) above must be in writing. 
Rule 15(g)(1) and (2) and (3): No changes. 
* Rule 15(h)(1) and (2): Substantive changes; proposed new provisions still allow 
OPC counsel to disclose nonpublic information without notice to the respondent but only 
under limited and specific circumstances when the disclosure is essential to the 
furtherance of an ongoing OPC investigation, Without the ability to disclose selected 
confidential information to potential witnesses in order to gain information in some 
matters, OPC cannot complete its investigations. 
Rule 1 5(i): Editing changes only; capitalizes the first letter in the word "rules'1 as 
it refers to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
Rule 16 (Dissemination of disciplinary information) 
* Rule 16(a): Substantive change; this subsection currently lists which notices of 
disciplinary information must be transmitted to various disciplinary agencies, the public 
and the courts. The proposed addition obligates OPC to transmit such notices to the 
Judicial Conduct Commission if the subject of the discipline is a sitting or former judge. 
The disciplinary notice which heretofore has been inadvertently omitted from this 
subsection is "resignation with discipline pending" (which is tantamount to disbarment) 
and this omission has been added with the proposed amendments. 
* Rule 16(b): Substantive change; the proposed amendment requires the 
Executive Director of the Bar rather than the Administrative Office of the Courts ("AOC") 
to publish notices of disciplinary suspensions and disbarments as well as public 
resignations with discipline pending and transfers to disability status. The change is 
consistent with the Rule's original intent that such notice be given, but removes the 
burden on the AOC pursuant to the AOC's request. In fact, insofar as the Bar has 
ascertained, the AOC has never published these notices under the current Rule. 
* Rule 16(c): Substantive change; the proposed amendment requires the Bar's 
Executive Director rather than the AOC to transmit notices of certain disciplinary 
information to all Utah courts. As is the case with the proposed changes in subsection 
(b) above, the AOC has requested the Bar to transmit these notices directly. Changes 
also add the inadvertently omitted disciplinary category of "resignation with discipline 
pending" to the list. 
Rule 17 (Additional rules of procedure) 
Rule 17(a): Editing change only; minor revision is proposed to improve 
readability and consistency. 
Rule 17(b): No changes. 
* Rule 17(c): Substantive and editing changes; the word "private" is eliminated to 
correlate with the substantive changes proposed for Rules 10(b)(5)(E) and 10(c) which 
give screening panels the authority to recommend public reprimands. 
. . Rule 17(d): No changes. 
Rule 17(e): No changes. 
* Rule 17(f): Substantive changes; proposed amendment expressly applies the 
same procedures for handling attorney ethics complaints against Bar Commissioners 
and OPC counsel as to members of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The 
proposed revisions also adopt the same grounds for dismissal of such complaints as the 
grounds required for dismissal of all other attorney misconduct complaints. The 
changes clarify that special counsel for handling such complaints is a lawyer other than 
an OPC lawyer, that special counsel must be appointed by the Supreme Court, and that 
special counsel shall report the results of the investigation to OPC. The proposed 
changes in Rule 10(a)(6) dealing with dismissals of informal complaints have also been 
incorporated into this Rule for consistency purposes. 
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Rule 18 (Interim suspension for threat of harm) 
* Rule 18(a): Substantive change; to comport with the Pendleton attorney 
discipline decision the proposed modification to this subsection states that "an action is 
covered under this rule when the petition for interim suspension is filed.,:S 
Rule 18(b): Editing change only; minor grammatical revision replaces the word 
"the" to the word "an." 
Rule 18(b)(1): Ho changes. 
Rule 18(b)(2): Editing changes only; proposed amendment replaces the word 
"office" with the term "OPC" for consistency purposes. 
Rule 18(c): No changes. 
Rule 18(d): Editing change only; adds numeric equivalent of the number "two." 
Rule 19 (Lawyers convicted of a crime) 
* Rule 19(a): Substantive change; this proposed new provision requires a lawyer 
convicted of any crime to notify OPC in writing of that fact within 30 days after being 
convicted. Heretofore, only crimes which adversely reflected on a lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects needed to be reported. The 
current Rule leaves it in the hands of the convicted attorney to determine whether or not 
a crime meets that standard. OPC believes it is in a better position to make that 
decision. 
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* Rule 19(b): Both substantive and editing changes; proposed revisions comport 
with new requirements in Rule 19(a) above for consistency purposes, including re-
numbering the subsection. The more important substantive amendment requires that 
an attorney report all crimes to OPC, and not just those crimes which "reflect adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. . .." 
* Rule 19(c): Substantive change; to comport with the Pendleton disciplinary 
opinion, this substantive revision states that an action is commenced under this Rule 
when both the petition for interim suspension and the formal complaint are filed.6 
Proposed amendments also clarify that a respondent under the circumstances set forth 
in Rule 19(c) is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing but may request an informal 
hearing. This change is consistent with the provisions of current Rule 19 that state that 
the district court shall place the respondent on interim suspension upon proof that the 
respondent has been convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, regardless of the 
pendency of any appeal. The proposed change is also consistent with the current 
provision in Rule 19 which states that a certified judgment of conviction constitutes 
conclusive evidence that the respondent committed the crime. These provisions seem 
to indicate as a whole that the hearing a respondent attorney is entitled to is not an 
evidentiary hearing to attack the facts underlying the conviction. In this regard, if a 
hearing is to be held, it is to be held solely upon the issue of whether or not the crime 
legally reflects adversely on the respondents honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer. Editing change re-numbers this subsection. 
Rule 19(d), (e)s (f), (g) and (h): Editing changes only; proposed amendments 
provide for re-numbering of subsections to comport with the addition of new subsection 
(a) in Rule 19. 
Rule 20 (Discipline bv consent) 
~k Rule 20(a): Substantive change; proposed amendment clarifies that a 
respondent proposing discipline by consent must waive the right to a screening panel 
hearing. It also deletes the cumbersome requirement that the proposed discipline by 
consent first be submitted to the screening panel chair (as opposed to just the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee Chair) before being presented to the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee Chair for consideration. The remainder of changes are minor editing 
revisions for consistency and clarity purposes. 
Rule 20(b): Editing changes only; proposed minor revisions suggested for 
clarity, readability and consistency purposes. 
Rule 20(c): No changes. 
* Rule 20(c)(1): Editing changes only; minor revisions for consistency purposes. 
Rule 20(c)(2) and (3) and (4): No changes. 
Rule 20(d): No changes. 
Rule 20(d)(1) and (2) and (3) and (4): No changes. 
* Rule 20(d)(5): Substantive change; the current Rule reads that the respondent 
shall submit an affidavit consenting to imposition of the approved disciplinary sanction 
and acknowledging that the material facts alleged are true. The modifying phrase "for 
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purposes of discipline" has been added to the beginning of the sentence in subsection 
(d)(5). OPC has had a number of cases where consents to discipline have been placed 
in jeopardy because although a respondent was willing to acknowledge the facts for 
purposes of disciplinary proceedings, he or she was not willing to acknowledge them for 
other purposes, e.g., criminal prosecutions or pending civil suits, etc. The proposed 
limitation should not affect a respondent's exposure in those other types of proceedings 
since the standard of proof differs in each of the other proceedings. This change is 
consistent with a similar provision in the ABA's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement. 
Rule 20(d)(6): No changes. 
Rule 20(e): Editing changes only; the proposed changes in the other 
subsections of Rule 20 make current subsection (e) inaccurate and unnecessary and it 
therefore should be deleted. 
Rule 21 (Resignation with discipline pending) 
Rule 21(a): Editing change; the current Rule provides that a respondent may 
resign from the Bar prior to the adjudication of a pending complaint with the consent of 
the Supreme Court and upon such terms as the Supreme Court may impose for the 
protection of the public. The proposed amendment specifically states that a resignation 
can be made only with the consent of the Supreme Court. 
* Rule 21(b)(1): Substantive change; consistent with the proposed amendment to 
Rule 20(d)(5) and for reasons discussed therein, respondents should be required to 
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admit for only the purposes of the disciplinary proceeding the facts upon which the 
allegations of misconduct are based in order to resign with discipline pending 
Ruie 21(b)(2) and (3) and (4) and (5): No changes. 
Rule 21(b)(6): Editing change only; proposed amendment specifies that in 
order to resign with discipline pending, respondents must agree to comply with all the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability including Rule 26(b) regarding notices to 
clients and return of clients' property. Rule 26(b) sets forth the exact requirements that 
apply when a respondent winds up his or her legal practice. 
Rule 21(b)(7): No changes. 
Rule 21(c): Editing changes only; proposed change spells out equivalent of the 
number "20" and adds the numeric equivalent of the number "ten/5 
Ruie 21(d): No changes. 
Ruie 21 (e): Editing changes only; proposed change specifies that respondents 
who resign with discipline pending must comply with Ruie 25 governing re-admissions 
to the Bar. The specification makes explicit what is already implicit: a resignation with 
discipline pending is tantamount to disbarment. 
± Rule 21(f): Substantive changes; proposed subsection (f) is entirely new. Trie 
proposed amendments allow an attorney to resign with discipline pending when the 
allegations of iegal misconduct, if proven, may not justify disbarment. In such cases, 
the respondent must comply with requirements set forth in this subsection. The 
requirements differ from those imposed by subsections (b) and (c) in that: (1) the 
respondent need not admit that the facts constitute grounds for discipline and that the 
admittance is for purposes of the disciplinary proceedings only: and (2) the provisions 
contained in subsection (c) do not apply. 
Rule 22 (Reciprocal discipline) 
± Rule 22(a): Substantive change; the current Rule states that a lawyer admitted 
to practice law in Utah shall promptly inform OPC that he or she has been publicly 
disciplined by another regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. The proposed 
revision replaces the word "promptly" with a definitive time period of 30 days. The 
remaining changes are minor editing changes. 
Rule 22(b) and (b)(1): No changes. 
Rule 22(b)(2). (d) and (e): Editing changes only; proposed revision spells out 
equivalent of the number "30" and more accurately rephrases "in all other aspects" 
except as provided in [subsections] (c) and (d) above. 
Rule 23 (Proceedings in which lawyer is declared to be 
Incompetent or alleged to be incapacitated) 
* Rule 23(a): Both substantive and editing changes; provides that in cases where 
no guardian or legal representative has been appointed for a lawyer on disability status, 
a copy of the court's order shall be served on the director of the institution to which the 
lawyer has been committed. 
Rules 23(b) and (c) and (d)(1)-(4); No changes. 
Rule 23(d)(5): Editing changes only; more appropriate sentence structure more 
accurately states that the Ear rather than the Bar Examiners Committee certifies 
successful completion of the Bar examination for admission to practice. 
Rule 23(d)(6) and (7): No changes. 
Rule 24 (Reinstatement fol lowing a 
suspension of six months or less) 
* Rule 24: Substantive change; proposed amendment imposes new requirement 
that a respondent file an affidavit with OPC stating that he or she has fully reimbursed 
the Client Security Fund for amounts paid on account of the respondent's misconduct in 
reinstatement cases following a suspension of six months or less. Editing changes spell 
out the equivalent of the number "10" and provide the numeric equivalent of the number 
"six." 
Rule 25 (Reinstatement fol lowing a suspension 
of more than six months: readmission) 
Rule 25(a): Editing changes only; proposed amendment's provide numeric-
equivalents of various spelled out numbers. 
* Rule 25(b): Substantive changes; proposed amendment eliminates an advance 
cost deposit for petitions for reinstatement to cover the anticipated costs of the 
reinstatement proceeding because this requirement has not been imposed in practice. 
Another suostaniive revision requires a respondent seeking readmission to receive a 
report and recommendation from the Bars Character and Fitness Committee before 
filing a. petition in the district court. Ho where is it specified in either the Rules 
Governing Admission or the Rules for Lawyer Discipline and Disability whether the 
petitioner should apply for readmission and undergo a character and fitness review 
before or after filing a petition with the district court. The Commission, based on 
recommendations from OPC and the Bar's Admission Committee, believes it makes 
more sense to have the character and fitness evaluation readily available for the district 
court's review in conjunction with the former attorney's petition. A further revision 
makes clear that a petitioner is obligated to fulfill the remainder of admission 
requirements (such as educational requirements and payment of fees) before being 
eligible for admission pursuant to district court order. 
Rule 25(c): No changes. 
Rule 25(d): Editing changes; minor amendments spell our the number "30." 
Rule 25(e)(1) and (2) and (3) and (3)(A): No changes. 
Rule 25(e)(3)(B): Editing change; minor amendment provides numeric 
equivalent of the number "six." 
Rule 25(e)(3)(C): No changes. 
* Rule 25 (e)(4): Substantive change; this subsection's proposed revisions 
provide that a respondent who seeks readmission (after disbarment) must give OPC a 
copy of the Bar's Character and Fitness Committee's report and recommendation. The 
changes also provide that a copy of the report should be forwarded to the district court 
assigned to the petition for readmission after the respondent files the petition. These 
changes clarify the order of some of the sieps a respondent must take in order to be 
considered for readmission. 
Rule 25(e)(5): No changes 
Rule 25(e)(6): Editing changes, provides numeric equivalent for the spelled out 
number 'one.1' 
Rule 25(e)(7): Ho changes. 
Rule 25(e)(8): Substantive change, subsection (e)(8) which is new expressly 
requires thai a respondent fully reimburse the Client Security Fund for any amounts the 
Bar has paid on account of the respondent attorney's misconduct. 
Rule 25(f): Editing change; minor amendment adds spelled out word "sixty." 
Rule 25(g): Editing changes; provides spelled out numeric equivalent of "90.r 
Rule 25(h): Editing changes; provides numeric equivalent of ihe number "one." 
Rule 25(1): No changes. 
Rule 25(j): Editing changes; adds spelled out number "twenty." 
Rule 26 (Notice of disabi l i ty or suspension; return 
of cl ients' property: refund of unearned fees) 
Rule 26(a): Editing change only; minor revision adds spelled out equivalent of 
the number "30." 
Rule 25(b): Editing changes only; provides numeric equivalent of "siy" and 
spelled out equivalent of the number "20." 
Rule 26(b)(1) through (6): Ho changes. 
Rule 26(b)(7): Editing change' provides spelled out equivalent of The number 
"10" 
Rule 26ic;: No onanges 
Rule 26(d): Editing change; provides numeric equivalent of the number "six." 
Rule 26(e): No changes. 
Rxile 27 (Appointment of trustee to protect clients' interest when lawyer 
disappears, dies, is suspended or disbarred, or is transferred to disability status) 
Rule 27(a) and fb): No changes. 
* Rule 27(c): Substantive change; proposed amendment expressly provides 
immunity for a person appointed under Rule 30 as a trustee the change is 
commensurate with the proposed changes in Rule 13. 
Rule 28 (Appeal by complainant) 
Rule 28: Editing change; any dismissal, just not a "summary" dismissal, may be 
appealed under Rule 10(a)(6). 
Rule 29 (Statute of limitations) 
Rule 29: Editing change only; adds the numeric equivalent of spelled out 
number "four." 
Rule 30 (Costs and attorney fees) 
± Rule 30(a): Substantive change; makes discretionary rather than mandatory the 
award of costs against a respondent when OPC prevails The proposed amendments 
also grant rhe court discretion to award attorney fees against a respondent when tne 
Defense vvaE: >,vi:hoj' merr or no: asserted in gooo faitn Autnor.zmo CPC tc coliect 
attorney fees in successful cases may provide a deterrent and a quicker resolution in 
those cases where attorneys lack a meritorious defense. In such cases, respondents 
often have nothing to lose regarding expenditure of attorney fees since they either 
represent themselves o\' their attorney friends or relatives represent them pro bono. 
Under the proposed change, attorney fees may be charged for work performed 
beginning with the filing of the formal complaint. Finally, the proposed revisions also 
expressly exclude a respondent's entitlement or award of attorney fees. Currently, a 
respondent is not entitled to costs. 
Rule 30(b): No changes. 
* Rule 30(c): Substantive change; proposed amendment recognizes an exception 
(set forth in new subsection (d) below) to the general rule that costs should not be 
recoverable in disability cases. 
* Rule 30(d): Substantive change; proposed amendment allows trustees to 
coiiect costs for notification to a respondent's clients. The reason for the change is the 
belief that trustees who donate time to attorney disability cases should not be 
responsible for costs associated with their volunteer efforts such as charges for posiage 
or copying. 
Rule 31 (Noncompliance with child support order, child visitation order, 
subpoena or order relating to paternity or child support proceeding) 
Rule 31(a) and (b): Editing changes: minor revisions are proposed 10 provide 
clarify and consistency. 
Rule 32 (Failure to answer charges) 
rr Rule 32(a) and (b): Substantive change; Rule 32 is new. These subsections 
provide that a respondent's failure to answer charges constitutes an admission of the 
allegations, and that failure to appear before a. screening hearing panel, after actual 
receipt of notice, constitutes an admission of the allegations under consideration or 
concession of the motion or recommendations under consideration. These changes are 
based in iarge part on the corresponding ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement. The proposed Rule also requires good cause to delay proceedings 
because of a. respondent's failure to appear. 
WHEREFORE, the Utah State Bar requests the Court to approve the changes to 
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability as set forth above and reflected in the 
rediine version of the Rules contained in the addendum. 
Dated this £$ a ay of February, 2002. 
Katherine A. Fox / 
General Counsel 
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